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SELECTION OF EQUILIBRIA IN A LINEAR QUADRATIC MEAN-FIELD
GAME
FRANC¸OIS DELARUE, RINEL FOGUEN TCHUENDOM
Abstract. In this paper, we address an instance of uniquely solvable mean-field game with
a common noise whose corresponding counterpart without common noise has several equilib-
ria. We study the selection problem for this mean-field game without common noise via three
approaches.
A common approach is to select, amongst all the equilibria, those yielding the minimal cost
for the representative player. Another one is to select equilibria that are included in the support
of the zero noise limit of the mean-field game with common noise. A last one is to select equilibria
supported by the limit of the mean-field component of the corresponding N-player game as the
number of players goes to infinity. The contribution of this paper is to show that, for the class
under study, the last two approaches select the same equilibria, but the first approach selects
another one.
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game, Selection of equilibria, Peano phenomenon, Vanishing viscosity, Transition point, Scalar
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1. Introduction
1.1. A short overview of MFGs. The theory of Mean Field Games (MFGs for short) is
concerned with the study of asymptotic Nash equilibria for stochastic differential games with
an infinite number of players subject to a mean-field interaction (i.e each player is affected by
the other players only through the empirical distribution of the system). In this regard, it is
worth recalling that a Nash equilibrium constitutes a consensus (or compromise) between all
the players from which no player has unilateral incentive to deviate.
As the number of players (which we denote by the upper case N throughout the paper) of the
stochastic differential game increases, finding Nash equilibria becomes an increasingly complex
problem as it typically involves a system of N PDEs set on a space of dimension of order N . The
motivation for studying the asymptotic regime is to reduce the underlying complexity. At least
in the case where the players are driven by independent noises, the hope is indeed to take benefit
from the theory of propagation of chaos for mean-field interacting systems (see for example [44])
in order to reduce the analysis of the whole system to the analysis of a single representative
player.
In the analysis of the limiting MFGs, the representative player aims at minimizing a cost
functional while interacting with an environment described by a flow of distributions. Finding
Nash equilibria thus consists in finding optimal states whose flow of marginal distributions
matches exactly the flow of distributions describing the environment. This is a constraint of
McKean-Vlasov type which requires to solve a fixed point problem over the set of time-dependent
paths with values in the space of probability measures.
MFGs were introduced independently and simultaneously by Lasry and Lions [36, 37, 38]
and by Caines, Huang and Malhame´ [29] (who used the name of Nash Certainty Equivalence).
We refer to the notes [5] written by Cardaliaguet for a very good introduction to the subject.
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We also refer to the works of Carmona and Delarue, who studied MFGs with a probabilistic
approach, see for instance [7, 10] together with the recent two-volume monograph [8, 9]. Many
other authors have contributed to the rapid development of the theory, see the references in
[8, 9]. Under suitable regularity conditions of the cost functional, existence of Nash equilibria
has been proved in the above works (for instance by using Schauder’s fixed point argument).
Further monotonicity conditions introduced by Lasry and Lions guarantee uniqueness of the
solution, see [38].
1.2. A specific class of MFGs. In the earlier paper [24], Foguen Tchuendom investigated
a class of Linear-Quadratic Mean Field Games (LQ-MFGs) in which the representative player
at equilibrium interacts with the mean of its distribution. Here and below, we call LQ-MFG
a mean-field game whose cost functionals are quadratic in the state and control variables and
whose dynamics is linear in the state and control variables: Still, the coefficients may depend
in a more general fashion upon the distribution of the population; this is contrast with earlier
works on mean-field games, in which the coefficients of LQ-MFGs are also required to be linear
or quadratic with respect to the mean of the population.
In [24], the N players in the finite game are also assumed to be subject to a common (or
systemic) noise in addition to independent noises. Such a modeling is motivated by practical
applications. We refer to the review of Gue´ant, Lasry and Lions [27] for earlier examples of
mean-field games with a common noise. We also refer to the linear-quadratic model (including
linear-quadratic coefficients with respect to the mean of the population) introduced by Carmona,
Fouque and Sun [12] for another example involving a common noise. In comparison with mean-
field games without common noise, the major change in mean-field games with common noise
is that, due to the presence of common noise, the representative player at equilibrium feels the
mean-field interaction through the conditional distribution of its state given the common noise.
In [24], equilibria to the LQ-MFGs with common noise under study are shown to be characterized
by a one dimensional standard Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential Equation (FBSDE for
short). In this FBSDE, the forward part describes the conditional mean of the representative
player’ state given the common noise and the backward one accounts for the affine part of the
feedback control. Thanks to the common noise, this FBSDE is non-degenerate and thus satisfies
an existence and uniqueness theorem proved by Delarue in [16]; in particular, the LQ-MFGs
with common noise addressed in [24] have a unique equilibrium. Importantly, [24] provides a
counter-example to uniqueness of Nash equilibria for a mean-field game in the same class of
LQ-MFGs but in the absence of common noise.
1.3. From restoration of uniqueness to selection of equilibria. The result obtained in
[24] is an example of restoration of uniqueness by addition of a common noise. The striking fact
in this example is that the action of the common noise onto uniqueness is limpid. Basically,
the LQ structure forces equilibria to be (one-dimensional) Gaussian processes conditional on
the realization of the common noise: Whilst the covariance structure is independent of the
realization of the common noise (and hence is deterministic), the conditional mean follows an
Ornstein-Ulhenbeck process driven by the common noise. Hence, the class of LQ-MFG’s tackled
in [24] is parametric (the parameter being one-dimensional) and the role of the common noise
is precisely to force the parameter randomly. The fact that equilibria have a one-dimensional
structure plays a crucial role in the rest of the paper. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that
Foguen Tchuendom’s result was extended by Delarue in [17] to a larger class of nonparametric
non-LQ-MFGs but at the cost of using an infinite dimensional common noise, which makes it
much too complex for our purpose.
Foguen Tchuendom’s result prompts us to address the following question: For an instance of
LQ-MFG which is uniquely solvable under the presence of common noise but which has several
SELECTION OF EQUILIBRIA IN A LINEAR QUADRATIC MEAN-FIELD GAME 3
equilibria in the absence of common noise, is there any way to select some specific equilibria to
the game without common noise? To answer this question, we propose here three methods of
selection, as described below:
(1) (minimal cost selection) Amongst all the equilibria to the LQ-MFG without common
noise, select those that minimize the cost of the representative player;
(2) (zero noise limit selection) Consider the unique stochastic equilibrium to the LQ-MFG
with common noise and find its weak limit as the intensity of the noise tends to 0. If
this limit exists, select the equilibria that are included in the support of the limit.
(3) (N -player limit selection) Solve the N -player game without common noise and find the
weak limit of the equilibrium as N → +∞. If this limit exists, select the equilibria that
are included in the support of the limit.
Whilst the first method is directly connected with the optimization structure underpinning
the LQ-MFG, the second approach is in fact much more general. Indeed, the idea of restoring
uniqueness by means of a random forcing has been extensively studied in probability theory. It
goes back to the earlier work of Zvonkin [50] on the solvability of one-dimensional stochastic
differential equations driven by non-Lipschitz continuous drifts. Several authors also contributed
to the subject and addressed the higher dimensional framework, among which Veretennikov [49],
Krylov and Ro¨ckner [31], Davie [15]... Similar questions have been also addressed in the frame-
work of infinite dimensional stochastic differential equations, see for instance Flandoli, Gubinelli
and Priola [23] and the monograph of Flandoli [22]. Still, although restoration of uniqueness has
been investigated in various frameworks, including, as we just mentioned, infinite dimensional
ones, finding the zero-noise limit when the corresponding deterministic or ordinary equation
has multiple solutions is a challenging question, for which fewer results are known. The earlier
result in this direction is due to Bafico and Baldi, see [2]; it provides a rather complete picture
of the selection procedure for one-dimensional dynamics with isolated singularities. Examples
treated in [2] will serve us as a benchmark throughout this paper, but, in fact, we will mostly
follow another approach to these examples due to Delarue and Flandoli [18]. In [18], the authors
not only address the zero noise limit but also make explicit the typical time at which selection
occurs; our strategy is to do the same below. We refer the reader to [48] for a third proof, to
[26] for related large deviations principles, and to [1, 19, 30] for examples of selection in higher
(possibly infinite) dimension.
As for the third method of selection, it is directly connected with the fact that mean-field
games are understood as limiting versions of games with finitely many players. In this regard, it
is a rather challenging question to show that equilibria to the finite player games do converge to
a solution of the corresponding mean-field game. In fact, the approach to this question depends
on the nature of the equilibria: In the finite player system, equilibria may be searched in an
open or closed loop form. As for open loop equilibria, as considered in [24], weak compactness
methods were first studied by Fischer [21] and Lacker [34]. Generally speaking, the point therein
is to prove that the support of any weak limit of the laws of the empirical distributions of the
finite player game equilibria is included in the set of solutions to the limiting mean-field game.
Still, to the best of our knowledge, nothing has been said so far on the exact shape of this
support (at least when there is no uniqueness): This is the question we want to address below
in the particular example specified in the next section. As for equilibria in closed loop form,
the first main general result on the convergence of equilibria, at least when uniqueness to the
limiting mean-field game holds true, is due to Cardaliaguet, Delarue, Lasry and Lions [6] and is
based on the so-called master equation for mean-field games, which is a PDE set on the space
of probability measures: As our case is parametric, the master equation for it reduces (up to
a correction term) to a one-dimensional standard PDE. Importantly, this PDE here takes the
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form of a scalar conservation law and, although uniqueness does not hold for the mean-field
game under study and, accordingly, the master equation does not admit a classical solution,
the so-called entropy solution of this scalar conservation law is intended to be, amongst all the
possible solutions, of a special interest. And, indeed, although we deal with open loop equilibria,
we make an intense use of it throughout the text. We will go back to this point next. In fact, the
reader must be aware that, very recently, Lacker [33] succeeded to extend the weak compactness
approach initiated in [34] to closed loop equilibria in order to tackle cases when uniqueness does
not hold and henceforth when the master equation is ill-posed. Although this new result in the
literature on mean-field games is not of a special use in the sequel, it demonstrates that, similar
to the question we here address for open loop equilibria, the identification of the weak limits of
closed loop equilibria in case when uniqueness does not hold is a hot question as well. In this
regard, it is worth mentioning that, in a parallel forthcoming work to ours, Cecchin, Dai Pra,
Fisher and Pelino [13] address a similar question but for equilibria in closed loop form: Namely,
for a continuous time mean-field game on a two-state space for which uniqueness does not hold,
they investigate the equilibria that are selected by the limit of the closed-loop equilibria of the
N -player game.
1.4. Summary of the results and organization of the paper. Generally speaking, we focus
below on a specific example of the aforementioned parametric LQ-MFG class, which admits
three equilibria. As made clear in the text, these three equilibria are parametrized by the three
following values of the parameter: −1, 0 and 1. In this framework, we prove that the zero noise
limit and N -player limit selection methods select with probability 1/2 the two equilibria −1 and
1 whilst the minimal cost selection selects the equilibrium 0. So, the first striking fact of this
paper is to show that the minimal cost selection does not yield the same result as the other
two approaches! The second one is to show that, here, taking the vanishing viscosity limit and
taking the limit over the number of players give the same result: Intuitively, the idiosyncratic
noises in the N -payer game here aggregate into a common noise of intensity of order 1/
√
N ,
which explains why the two approaches yield the same result. The last important point is that
this example shows that several equilibria may be physically selected in this way; even more,
it makes clear the fact that randomized equilibria may naturally appear for mean-field games
without common noise: Using the same terminology as in [33] (see also [9, 11, 34]), the limit
that picks up the two equilibria −1 and 1 with probability 1/2 should be regarded as a weak
mean-field equilibrium; also, the randomness that carries the choice between −1 and 1 should
be regarded as an endogenous common noise in a game without exogenous common noise!
Our result should be compared with [13] and [33]. First, it is worth mentioning that our
work has some similarities with [13]: As in [13], we show that the master equation for the LQ-
MFG without uniqueness can be addressed by using the theory of entropy solutions to scalar
conservation laws; as we already mentioned, there is a (one-dimensional) nonlinear hyperbolic
equation underpinning the master equation and its entropy solution permits to identify the
optimal feedback that is selected by both the zero noise and N -player limits. For sure, this
general fact certainly goes beyond the two examples tackled here and in [13]. Certainly, it should
be addressed in a more systematic way in the future, at least in one-dimensional parametric
models. Indeed, the key point in both papers is that equilibria are driven by a one-dimensional
parameter: Here, the parameter is the mean of the one-dimensional state variable and, in [13], it
is the probability weight of one of the two elements of the state space. Although it sounds to be a
very exciting question, selection in higher (but finite) dimensional parametric model is probably
much more challenging: The master equation is then expected to reduce to a more complicated
non-conservative hyperbolic system. The latter fact is made clear in [3, Section 2] for mean-field
games with a finite state space of any arbitrary cardinality. Similarly, the model we address
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below can be also written out in higher dimension d ≥ 2, but, then, the aforementioned one-
dimensional PDE underpinning the master equation turns into a non-conservative hyperbolic
system as well.
Another interesting remark about [13] is that, in the example addressed therein, theN -player
limit selects one equilibrium only while it selects two equilibria in our example: The difference
comes from the fact that we here choose an initial condition that exactly seats at the singularity
of the entropy solution of the conservation law. As explained below, in our framework, our
method can be adapted to handle initial conditions that are away from the singularity, in which
case one equilibrium only is selected by the zero-noise and N -player limits.
Lastly, it must be stressed that a related question to ours is studied in [33, Subsection 7.2]:
For a pretty similar LQ-MFG, it is proven in [33] that, given the weak mean-field equilibrium that
charges, with symmetric weights, the two equilibria −1 and 1 of the game without uniqueness,
it is possible to construct a sequence of approximate Nash equilibria that converges to it in the
weak sense.
The paper is organized as follows. We implement the first method, which we call minimal
cost selection, in Section 2. In Section 4, we make clear what is the notion of master equation
in our setting. It plays a key role in the subsequent analysis of the zero-noise limit and of the
convergence of the N -player equilibria. Section 5 is dedicated to the analysis of the zero-noise
limit, whilst we focus on the limit of the N -player equilibria in Section 5. Further computations,
that are used in the text, are detailed in Appendix.
2. Notations and statements
2.1. Description of the mean-field game and related selection of equilibria. For the
sake of clarity, we recall the class of LQ-MFGs addressed in [24] and the corresponding charac-
terization of equilibria through FBSDEs.
We are given two independent (one-dimensional) Brownian motions B = (Bt)t∈[0,T ] and
W = (Wt)t∈[0,T ] defined on a complete filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ],P) satisfying
the usual conditions. The representative player’s initial state is given in the form of a random
variable ξ ∈ L2F0 , L2F0 standing for the collection of square integrable F0-measurable random
variables. We suppose (mostly for convenience) that the filtration (Ft)t∈[0,T ] corresponds to the
natural filtration generated by ξ,W,B augmented with P-null sets. Also, we let (FBt )t∈[0,T ] be
the filtration generated by B only and augmented with P-null sets.
Throughout the paper, we consider controls α := (αt)t∈[0,T ] ∈ H2, where H2 is the space of
(Ft)t∈[0,T ]-progressively measurable processes satisfying
E
[ ∫ T
0
|αt|2dt
]
< +∞.
Finally, we consider three constants κ ∈ R, σ ≥ 0, σ0 ≥ 0 and three bounded and Lipschitz
continuous functions f, b, g : R→ R. The MFG problem considered in [24] reads:
Scheme 1. (MFG-problem)
(1) (Mean field Input) If σ0 > 0, consider a continuous (FBt )t∈[0,T ]-adapted process (µt)t∈[0,T ]
taking values in R. If σ0 = 0, take (µt)t∈[0,T ] as a deterministic (continuous real-valued)
curve.
(2) (Cost Minimization) Find α∗ ∈ H2, satisfying
J(α∗) = min
α∈H2
J(α) := min
α∈H2
E
[∫ T
0
1
2
[α2t + (f(µt) +Xt)
2]dt+
1
2
(XT + g(µT ))
2
]
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under the stochastic dynamics{
dXt = [κXt + αt + b(µt)]dt+ σdWt + σ0dBt, ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
X0 = ξ.
(2.1)
(3) (McKean-Vlasov constraint) If σ0 > 0, find (µt)t∈[0,T ] such that:
∀t ∈ [0, T ], µt = E[Xα∗t |FBT ].
If σ0 = 0, find (µt)t∈[0,T ] such that the above holds true without conditional expectation.
We recall from [24] that one can characterize the solutions of this MFG-problem through
FBSDEs as in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Given the above data with σ0 > 0, there exists an MFG-solution (αt, µt)t∈[0,T ] if
and only if there exists an (FBt )t∈[0,T ] adapted solution (µξ,σ0t , hξ,σ0t , Zξ,σ0t )t∈[0,T ] to the FBSDE:

∀t ∈ [0, T ],
dµξ,σ0t =
[−w−2t hξ,σ0t + w−1t b(wtµξ,σ0t )]dt+ w−1t σ0dBt,
dhξ,σ0t =
[−wtf(wtµξ,σ0t )− wtηtb(wtµξ,σ0t )]dt+ Zξ,σ0t dBt,
and µξ,σ00 = E[ξ]w
−1
0 , h
ξ,σ0
T = g(µ
ξ,σ0
T ),
(2.2)
where
wt := exp
( ∫ T
t
(−κ+ ηs)ds
)
, ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
η := (ηt)t∈[0,T ] is the unique solution to the Riccati ODE:
dηt
dt
= η2t − 2κηt − 1, ηT = 1.
When FBSDE (2.2) is solvable, (αt, µt)t∈[0,T ] and (µ
ξ,σ0
t , h
ξ,σ0
t )t∈[0,T ] are connected by the fol-
lowing relationships:
µt = wtµ
ξ,σ0
t , ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
αt = −ηtXt − ht, where ht = w−1t hξ,σ0t , ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
(Xt)t∈[0,T ] being implicitly defined as the solution of the forward equation (2.1).
The result remains true when σ0 = 0 except that Z
ξ,σ0 in (2.2) is null, that is to say (2.2)
is a deterministic system.
We know from [24] that
(1) In the presence of common noise (i.e σ0 > 0), FBSDE (2.2) is uniquely solvable, in which
case there is a unique equilibrium to the LQ-MFG;
(2) In the absence of common noise (i.e σ0 = 0), FBSDE (2.2) is solvable, but it may admit
several solutions. In that case, which we call degenerate, there may be several equilibria.
2.2. A particular case. Throughout the paper, we consider the particular case when f = b =
ξ = 0 and g : R→ R given by
g(x) := − x
rδ
1|x|≤rδ − sign(x)1|x|>rδ , (2.3)
where for a fixed time δ ∈ (0, T ), rδ :=
∫ T
δ w
−2
s ds > 0.
Proposition 2 states that, in order to find an equilibrium to this particular LQ-MFG, it
is sufficient (and in fact necessary as well) to find a continuous, (FBt )t∈[0,T ] adapted, solution
(µ0,σ0t , h
0,σ0
t , Z
0,σ0
t )t∈[0,T ] to the FBSDE
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

dµ0,σ0t = −w−2t h0,σ0t dt+ w−1t σ0dBt, ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
dh0,σ0t = Z
0,σ0
t dBt, ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
µ0,σ00 = 0, h
0,σ0
T = g(µ
0,σ0
T ) .
(2.4)
In the presence of common noise (i.e σ0 > 0), the FBSDE (2.4) has a unique solution. Thus
there exists a unique equilibrium (wtµ
0,σ0
t , αt = −ηtXt − w−1t h0,σ0t )t∈[0,T ] whose randomness
depends only on the common noise B.
In absence of common noise (i.e σ0 = 0), the system (2.4) becomes

dµ0,0t = −w−2t h0,0t dt, ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
dh0,0t = 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
µ0,00 = 0, h
∗
T = g(µ
0,0
T ) .
(2.5)
Our analysis is based upon the following observation that (2.5) has multiple solutions:
Proposition 3. There exist three solutions to (2.5), which are
(µ0,0t , h
0,0
t , Z
0,0
t )t∈[0,T ] =
(
−A
∫ t
0
w−2s ds,A, 0
)
t∈[0,T ]
for A ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. (2.6)
Proof. The first point is to check that the functions given in the statement are indeed solutions
to the equation. In fact, the only difficult point is to check the boundary condition. When
A = 0, there is no difficulty. When A = 1, we observe that |µ0,0T | ≥ rδ. Hence, g(µ0,0T ) = 1,
which is indeed equal to 1. The case A = −1 is treated in the same way.
It then remains to check that there are no other solutions. In fact, whatever the solution,
the process (h0,0t )t∈[0,T ] must be constant, hence it must be equal to some A ∈ R. Then,
µ0,0T = −A
∫ T
0 w
−2
t dt.
If |A ∫ T0 w−2t dt| ≤ rδ, then the terminal boundary condition writes A = −A ∫ T0 w−2t dt/rδ ,
which yields A = 0. If |A ∫ T0 w−2t dt| > rδ, the boundary condition is in {−1, 1} and we get
A ∈ {−1, 1}.

2.3. Main statement. Referring to the three approaches detailed in Subsection 1.3, our main
statement has the following form:
Theorem 4. As for the example introduced in Subsection 2.2, the minimal cost selection selects,
in the regime σ0 = 0, the equilibrium corresponding to A = 0, whilst the zero-noise limit and the
N -player game (under the additional assumption that σ > 0) approaches select a randomized
equilibrium, as given by the equilibrium A = 1 with probability 1/2 and by the equilibrium A = −1
with probability 1/2.
We refer to Subsection 6.1 for a clear meaning of what we call N -player game in the frame-
work under study.
Although the rule of selection based upon minimal cost is sometimes met in the literature,
this result shows that it leads in fact to contradictory results with the other rules of selection
addressed in the paper. In fact, this should not come as a surprise. Indeed, it is worth mentioning
that, in Scheme 1, we can add any function of µT to the terminal cost entering the definition of
J . Obviously, this should not change the minimizers of J since the value of µT is kept frozen
in the optimization procedure. Still, this may certainly modify the output of the minimal cost
selection method. This strongly suggests that the minimal cost selection method is of a limited
scope.
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Regarding the two other selection rules, we draw reader’s attention to the following two
points. First, the randomized equilibrium given by A = ±1 with probability 1/2 should be
regarded as an equilibrium on its own. It requires a modicum of care to write out the match-
ing condition in item (3) of Scheme 1, but it can be done at the price of conditioning on the
value of A: Given the fact that A = ±1 is selected, the conditional mean of the state variable
is (−A ∫ t0 w−2s ds)t∈[0,T ], see (2.7). In other words, the randomized equilibrium carries an en-
dogenous systemic noise. Actually, this property is pretty similar to the one encountered for
weak solutions to stochastic differential equations, see [43], which carry an extra randomness in
addition to the exogeneous noise driving the equation. By analogy, the randomized equilibrium
could be called a weak mean-field equilibrium, see for instance [9, 11, 33, 34] for more details.
In this regard, it is worth mentioning that endogenous noises also appear in the analysis of the
Peano phenomenon by vanishing viscosity method, see [2].
In fact, and this is the second point we want to stress, the zero-noise limit and N -player
game approaches here select two equilibria (and not one equilibrium) because of the choice we
made for the initial condition ξ. As we show below, ξ = 0 is indeed the discontinuity point of
the entropy solution of a certain scalar conservation law that underpins the game, see (4.4). In
this regard, it is the worst (meaning the most unstable) initial point that we can guess. In fact,
we could have chosen an initial condition ξ 6= 0. In this framework, we have an extension of
Proposition 3: Whenever |ξ| < ∫ δ0 w−2s ds, the FBSDE (2.5) with µ0 = ξ as initial condition has
three solutions, which are
(µt, ht, Zt)t∈[0,T ] =
(
ξ −A
∫ t
0
w−2s ds,A, 0
)
t∈[0,T ]
for A ∈
{
−1, ξ∫ δ
0 w
−2
s ds
, 1
}
. (2.7)
In this framework, the methodology we develop for addressing the case ξ = 0 also applies
to the case |ξ| < ∫ δ0 w−2s ds, ξ 6= 0: The key tool is Proposition 16. It shows the following:
When initiating the mean field game with a common noise of intensity σ0 > 0 from ξ 6= 0, the
conditional mean of the representative player stays away from 0 with probability asymptotically
equal to 1 as σ0 tends to 0; similarly, when initiating the N -player game from a common point
ξ 6= 0, the empirical mean of the N players stays away from 0 with probability asymptotically
equal to 1 as N tends to ∞. In that case, both approaches should select only one equilibrium
among the above three ones: When ξ > 0, they should select A = −1 as it is the only one for
which (µt)t∈[0,T ] in (2.7) remains positive; similarly, when ξ < 0, they should select A = 1. For
sure, the case ξ = 0 is more difficult as the first step is precisely to show that the conditional
mean of the representative player in the mean-field game with common noise or the empirical
mean of the players in the N -player game go sufficiently far away from 0 before they stay either
in the positive or negative half-plane: This is the so-called notion of transition point introduced
in Subsection 5.3 that makes this fact clear.
3. Minimal cost selection
Keep in mind the particular LQ-MFG (2.4) and focus more specifically on the case without
common noise (i.e σ0 = 0), see (2.5). As stated in Proposition 3, one can construct three distinct
equilibria to the LQ-MFG. A way to choose an equilibrium among the three available ones is
to find which one(s) yield the minimal cost. This is what we call below the cost minimization
approach.
In our specific framework, we have the following result:
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Proposition 5. With the notations of Proposition 3, the cost minimization approach selects the
equilibrium corresponding to A = 0, i.e
(
µt = 0, αt = −ηtXt
)
t∈[0,T ] where Xt = wt
∫ t
0
σw−1s dWs, ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. Given, A ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, the dynamics of the representative player, (Xt)t∈[0,T ], and the
controls, (αt)t∈[0,T ], at equilibrium are given by

X0 = 0,
dXt =
[
(κ− ηt)Xt −Aw−1t
]
dt+ σdWt, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]
αt = −ηtXt −Aw−1t ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
We recall that the cost functional is given by
J(α) = E
[∫ T
0
1
2
[α2t + (Xt)
2]dt+
1
2
(XT + g(µT ))
2
]
, α ∈ H2.
By replacing the control at equilibrium in the cost functional, we get (with an obvious notation
for JA)
JA = E
[∫ T
0
1
2
[(−ηtXt − w−1t A)2 + (Xt)2]dt+
1
2
(XT +A)
2
]
, A ∈ {−1, 0, 1}.
In order to expand JA, we recall that
E[Xt] = µt = −Awt
∫ t
0
w−2s ds,
V[Xt] = E
[(
Xt − µt
)2]
= w2t σ
2
∫ t
0
w−2s ds, ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
We then expand JA as follows
JA = E
[∫ T
0
1
2
[(−ηtXt − w−1t A)2 + (Xt)2]dt+
1
2
(XT +A)
2
]
=
1
2
E
[∫ T
0
(
(1 + η2t )X
2
t + 2Aηtw
−1
t Xt +A
2w−2t
)
dt
]
+
1
2
E
[
(XT +A)
2
]
=
1
2
∫ T
0
(
(1 + η2t )E[(Xt − µt)2] + (1 + η2t )µ2t + 2Aηtw−1t µt +A2w−2t
)
dt+
1
2
E
[
(XT +A)
2
]
,
and then
JA =
A2
2
[ ∫ T
0
(
(1 + η2t )w
2
t
(∫ t
0
w−2s ds
)2
− 2ηt
(∫ t
0
w−2s ds
)
+ w−2t
)
dt
]
+
A2
2
(
1− wT
∫ T
0
w−2s ds
)2
+
1
2
w2T
∫ T
0
σ2w−2t dt+
1
2
∫ T
0
(1 + η2t )σ
2w2t
(∫ t
0
w−2s ds
)
dt,
where we used the fact that
E
[
(XT +A)
2
]
=
(
A+ µT
)2
+ E
[
(XT − µT )2
]
= A2
(
1− wT
∫ T
0
w−2s ds
)2
+ w2T
∫ T
0
σ2w−2t dt, ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
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In order to conclude, it remains to take into account the fact that
(1 + η2t )w
2
t
(∫ t
0
w−2s ds
)2
− 2ηt
(∫ t
0
w−2s ds
)
+ w−2t
= w2t
(∫ t
0
w−2s ds
)2
+
(
ηtwt
∫ t
0
w−2s ds− w−1t
)2
> 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
One concludes that JA, for A ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, is minimal when A = 0, and J±1 > J0, which
completes the proof. 
4. Master equation and related PDE estimates
In this section, we consider the case σ0 ∈ (0, 1) in the LQ-MFG under study. By [24], we
know that there is a unique equilibrium to the LQ-MFG, which is described by FBSDE (2.4).
Since (2.4) is uniquely solvable, we can use Ma-Protter-Yong’s four-step-scheme [41] to rep-
resent the solution, see also [42]. The four-step-scheme provides a so-called decoupling field that
decouples the two forward and backward equations of the FBSDE, meaning that it permits to
represent the backward component of the solution in terms of the forward one. Due to the
diffusive effect of the Brownian motion (Bt)t∈[0,T ], such a decoupling field is smooth. Through
the Cole-Hopf transformation (which we make clear below), it can be represented explicitly and
then inserted into the FBSDE (2.4): This allows to read the forward component of (2.4) as a
standard a SDE.
4.1. Master equation. The first step is to make the connection between the aforementioned
decoupling field and the notion of master equation.
The concept of master equation was introduced by Lions [40] in his lectures on mean-field
games at Colle`ge de France. Generally speaking, the master equation is an equation for the value
of the mean-field game. It is regarded as a function of the initial conditions of the game, which
include: Initial time, initial state of the representative player and initial state of the population.
To ensure that the value function indeed makes sense, equilibria must be unique.
In our case, σ0 ∈ (0, 1) and the LQ-MFG has a unique equilibrium. Still, we prefer to write
down an equation for the (optimal) feedback function of the LQ-MFG instead of an equation for
the value function. In fact, both are related with one another through a standard minimization
argument of the Hamiltonian and, in our framework, the (optimal) feedback function is given
by the opposite of the derivative of the value function, the derivative being taken with respect
to the private state of the representative player. We refer to [8, Chapters 3 and 4] for details.
Actually, we know from Proposition 2 that the equilibrium strategy of the LQ-MFG must
be of the form
αt = −ηtXt −w−1t hξ,σ0t , ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
where hξ,σ0 solves the backward equation in (2.4) (with a general initial condition ξ instead of
0 for the forward process).
Now, as we recalled right above, it is a standard fact from FBSDE theory, see for instance
[16, 41], that the backward process can be put in the form
hξ,σ0t = θ
σ0(t, µξ,σ0t ), ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
Here, θσ0 is called the decoupling field of the FBSDE (2.4). At the end of the day, the function
[0, T ]× R× P1(R) ∋ (t, x,m) 7→ −ηtx− w−1t θσ0(t, x, m¯),
is the right candidate for solving the master equation (for the feedback function). Here P1(R)
is the space of probability measures on R with a finite first moment and m¯ stands for the mean
of m when m ∈ P1(R). In fact, instead of writing down the full master equation (which is a
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difficult object, see [6, 14, 25] and [9, Chapter 5]), we just write down the equation for θσ0 ,
which is enough for our own purpose. To do so, notice from [16, 20], see also the book [35], that
θσ0 belongs to C1,2([0, T ) × R;R) ∩ C([0, T ] × R;R) and is a classical solution to the following
quasilinear parabolic PDE with terminal condition :

∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × R,
∂tθ
σ0(t, x)− w−2t θσ0(t, x)∂xθσ0(t, x) + 12σ20w−2t ∂2xxθσ0(t, x) = 0,
θσ0(T, x) = g(x), ∀x ∈ R.
(4.1)
This PDE is well-known in the literature: it is a Burgers type PDE. For theoretical and numerical
entry points on the analysis of Burgers type PDEs, we refer to the textbooks [28, 39], and to the
article [4]. It is uniquely solvable and a representation of its solution is obtained through the
Cole-Hopf transformation. For every t ∈ [0, T ), we write rt =
∫ T
t w
−2
s ds. This representation
reads as follows:
θσ0(t, x) =
∫
R
(x−yrt ) exp(σ
−2
0 (−
∫ y
0 g(v)dv − (x−y)
2
2rt
))dy∫
R
exp(σ−20 (−
∫ y
0 g(v)dv − (x−y)
2
2rt
))dy
. (4.2)
Observe from an obvious change of variable that we can easily reduce (4.1) (respectively (4.2)) to
the classical forward viscous Burgers equation (respectively to the classical Cole-Hopf formula).
It thus suffices to consider the function (t, x) ∈ [0, r0] 7→ θσ0(r◦−1t , x), where [0, r0] ∋ t 7→ r◦−1t is
the converse of [0, T ] ∋ t 7→ rt. This is extremely useful in order to invoke known results from
the literature on standard inviscid and viscous Burgers equations.
4.2. A priori bounds. We here collect several key estimates for θσ0 . The first one is
Lemma 6. The function |θσ0 | is bounded by 1, for any σ0 > 0.
Proof. The proof follows from the fact that |g| is bounded by 1 and that θσ0 is obtained by
transporting g along the forward component of (2.4). 
Things are much worse for the first-order derivative (and in fact this is the reason why the
analysis of the case σ0 = 0 is so difficult). In fact, by standard results in the theory of nonlinear
parabolic equations, see for instance the monograph [35], see also [16, 20, 41] for a probabilistic
point of view, θσ0 is Lipschtiz continuous in space, uniformly in time, but the Lipschitz constant
depends on σ0! Still, we have the following bound that gives a bound on the rate of explosion
as σ0 tends to 0.
Lemma 7. There exists a constant C such that
|∂xθσ0(t, x)| ≤ C
σ20
, ∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T )× R.
Proof. We perform the change of variable:
θˆσ0(t, x) = θσ0(σ20t, σ
2
0x), ∀(t, x) ∈
[
0,
T
σ20
)× R.
Then,{
∂tθˆ
σ0(t, x)− w−2t θˆσ0(t, x)∂xθˆσ0(t, x) + 12w−2t ∂2xxθˆσ0(t, x) = 0, ∀(t, x) ∈
[
0, T
σ20
)×R,
θˆσ0
(
T
σ20
, x
)
= g(σ20x), ∀x ∈ R.
Now, the result follows from standard PDE estimates for uniformly parabolic equations, see the
same references as before: [35] for PDE arguments and [16, 20, 41] for the probabilistic point of
view. 
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Although the gradient may blow up, we have in fact an upper bound for it.
Lemma 8. For any σ0 ∈ (0, 1), the function θσ0 is non-increasing in x.
Proof. As θσ0 is the decoupling field of (2.4), we have:
θσ0(t, x) = E
[
g(µt,x,σ0T )
]
,
where
dµt,x,σ0s = −w−2s θσ0
(
s, µt,x,σ0s
)
ds+ σ0w
−1
s dBs, s ∈ [t, T ], (4.3)
Using standard results for one-dimensional SDEs driven by Lipschitz coefficients, we know that
x ≤ y implies µt,x,σ0T ≤ µt,y,σ0T with probability 1. Since g is non-increasing, we complete the
proof. 
4.3. Zero-noise limit of the decoupling field. It is a well-known fact that, as σ0 tends to
0, θσ0 converges (in a sense that is made clear below) to the so-called entropy solution of the
inviscid version of (4.1). Again, we refer to [28, 39]. The limit is given by the field θ, whose
definition is as follows. For all (t, x) ∈ ([0, T ] × R), we let:
θ(t, x) =


−sign(x) if t ≤ δ, x ∈ R,
−sign(x) if t ≥ δ, |x| ≥ rδ − rt,
− xrδ−rt if t > δ, |x| < rδ − rt,
(4.4)
where we recall the definition of rδ in (2.3).
Most of our analysis for the zero-noise limit of the LQ-MFG with common noise as σ0 tends
to 0 is based upon sharp estimates of the difference between the fields θσ0 and θ. In this regard,
we have the following bound on the difference θσ0(t, x) − θ(t, x), for σ0 ∈ (0, 1) and for some
(t, x) ∈ [0, T )× R.
Proposition 9. Let Ψ(t, x, σ0) := θ
σ0(t, x) − θ(t, x), for (t, x, σ0) ∈ [0, T ) × R × (0, 1). Then,
for any non-negative non-decreasing curve ψ ∈ C([0, T ];R), which is strictly above the curve
[0, T ] ∋ t 7→ (rδ − rt)+ on a left-open interval containing [δ, T ], and for any function L from
(0,+∞) into itself such that limσ0→0 L(σ0) = +∞,
lim
σ0→0
sup
(t,x)∈[0,T ],|x|≥σ20L(σ0)+ψt
|Ψ(t, x, σ0)| = 0.
Proof. Following [45, 46], we know that, for any η > 0,
lim
σ0→0
sup
t∈[0,T ],|x|≥η+ψt
|Ψ(t, x, σ0)| = 0. (4.5)
The proof of (4.5) is in fact rather straightforward in our setting and we give it for completeness:
The first point is to observe that, when t ∈ (δ, T ], the system (2.5) initiated at time t from any
x ∈ R is well-posed and that the value of the backward process at time t then coincides with
θ(t, x). This is a well-known fact in the theory of hyperbolic equations, which also follows from
the small time analysis performed in [16] for FBSDEs with Lipschitz continuous coefficients. So,
for t ∈ [δ + ǫ, T ] for some ǫ ∈ (0, T − δ), we can make the difference between the two systems
(2.4) and (2.5) with (t, x) instead of (0, 0) as initial condition. Following [16], we can prove that
lim
σ0→0
sup
(t,x)∈[δ+ǫ,T ]×R
|Ψ(t, x, σ0)| = 0.
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Now, we can choose ǫ small enough such that rδ−rδ+ǫ < η/2. Then, for t < δ+ǫ and x ≥ η+ψt,∣∣Ψ(t, x, σ0)∣∣ = ∣∣θσ0(t, x) + 1∣∣ = ∣∣∣E[θσ0(δ + ǫ, µt,x,σ0δ+ǫ )+ 1]∣∣∣
≤ sup
(s,y)∈[δ+ǫ,T ]×R
|Ψ(s, y, σ0)|+ 4P
(
µt,x,σ0δ+ǫ ≤
η
2
)
,
where we used the same notation as in (4.3). Using the fact that θσ0 is non-positive in [0, T ]×R+,
we have
P
(
µt,x,σ0δ+ǫ ≤
η
2
)
≤ P
(
inf
s∈[t,δ+ǫ]
µt,x,σ0s ≤
η
2
)
≤ P
(
σ0 sup
s∈[t,δ+ǫ]
∣∣∣∣
∫ s
t
w−1r dBr
∣∣∣∣ ≥ η2
)
,
which suffices to get (4.5).
As a consequence, it suffices to prove that for any η ∈ (0, δ),
lim
σ0→0
sup
t∈[0,η],|x|≥σ20L(σ0)
|Ψ(t, x, σ0)| = 0, (4.6)
which is done in appendix, see Section 7. 
Remark 4.1. Obviously, the proof of Proposition 9 provides a stronger result than what the
statement claims, but the statement will suffice for our purpose. In fact, we feel better to state
in a minimal way the conditions that we need to establish Theorem 4. Moreover, we stress the
fact that the choice of the terminal condition here plays a crucial role in the proof of (4.6), see
again the appendix. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that there are numerous references
on the convergence of viscous solutions to entropy solutions of scalar conservation laws, see for
instance [32, 45, 46, 47]: In comparison, (4.6) is a fine estimate and a careful inspection would
be needed to determine to the precise class of functions g for which our methodology could be
applied.
4.4. L1 stability. In the analysis, we shall make use of the following lemma, which is a key
property of scalar conservation laws, see for instance [28, 39].
Lemma 10. Consider a Lipschitz continuous bounded function g˜ ∈ C(R;R) such that g˜ ≥ g,
and, for σ0 ∈ (0, 1), call θ˜σ0(t, x) the classical solution to

∀t ∈ [0, T ) × R,
∂tθ˜
σ0(t, x)− w−2t θ˜σ0(t, x)∂xθ˜σ0(t, x) + 12σ20w−2t ∂2xxθ˜σ0(t, x) = 0,
θ˜σ0(T, x) = g˜(x), ∀x ∈ R.
(4.7)
Then, the difference θ˜σ0 − θσ0 is preserved, that is(
θ˜σ0 − θσ0)(t, x) ≥ 0, ∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R.
Moreover, if g˜ and g coincide outside a compact subset of R, then the space integral of |θ˜σ0−θσ0 |
is also preserved, i.e∫ +∞
−∞
∣∣(θ˜σ0 − θσ0)(t, x)∣∣dx ≤ ∫ +∞
−∞
∣∣(g˜ − g)(x)∣∣dx, for all ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
In fact, the last inequality is an equality (because θ˜σ0 − θσ0 has a constant sign), but we
won’t use this fact in the sequel.
Proof. First step. The fact that (4.7) is well-posed is a standard fact in the theory of nonlinear
parabolic equations, see for instance [35], see also [16, 20, 41] for the probabilistic interpretation.
Importantly, since g˜ is Lipschitz continuous, θ˜σ0 is also Lipschtiz continuous in space, uniformly
in time.
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We then observe that the difference θ˜σ0 − θσ0 is the solution of
∂t
(
θ˜σ0 − θσ0)− w−2t θ˜σ0∂x(θ˜σ0 − θσ0)+ 12σ20w−2t ∂2xx(θ˜σ0 − θσ0)− w−2t ∂xθσ0(θ˜σ0 − θσ0) = 0,
which can be regarded as a linear equation in θ˜σ0 − θσ0 . Since g˜ ≥ g, we deduce from the
maximum principle that θ˜σ0 ≥ θσ0 .
Second step. The second part of the proof is a direct consequence of Theorem 3.3.1 in
[28]. 
5. Zero noise limit selection
The zero noise limit problem described in Section 2 requires to find the limit of the unique
equilibrium (when σ0 > 0) as σ0 → 0 (i.e as the common noise B influence on the players
vanishes). Through Proposition 2, it is equivalent to study the limit of the unique solution of
FBSDE (2.4) as σ0 → 0. In this regard, the previous section allows us to reduce the problem to
the analysis of the zero-noise limit of the forward SDE
dXt = −w−2t θσ0(t,Xt)dt+ σ0w−1t dBt, (5.1)
which we derived from the four-step-scheme. This prompts us to use the asymptotic form of the
decoupling field as σ0 tends to 0, as discussed in Proposition 9, in order to study the asymptotic
behaviour of (5.1). The difficulty to do so comes from the fact that the limit of the decoupling
field is discontinuous at x = 0 and for t close to 0. In particular, similar to the famous Peano
example for differential equations (the situation is even worse since the limiting drift is in fact
non-continuous whilst Peano example is for an ODE with a continuous drift), the zero-noise
limit of the forward SDE is not uniquely solvable. Taking benefit of the fact that this SDE is set
in dimension 1, we manage to adapt the techniques from [18] to determine the solutions of the
asymptotic forward SDE that are selected in the limit. Precisely, we show that this approach
selects the extremal equilibria (i.e A ∈ {1,−1}) in Proposition 3. Using the same terminology
as in [18], we also exhibit a transition space-time point, the precise definition of which is given
in the next subsection.
5.1. Main result. Thanks to the four-step-scheme, the solution to FBSDE (2.4) can now be
identified with the solution of (5.1) with 0 as initial condition at time 0. More precisely, thanks
to Proposition 9, we can write (µσ0t := µ
0,σ0
t )t∈[0,T ] as the solution of the SDE:{
µσ0t = −
∫ t
0 w
−2
s θ
σ0(s, µσ0s )ds +
∫ t
0 w
−1
s σ0dBs
= − ∫ t0 w−2s (θ(s, µσ0s ) + Ψ(s, µσ0s , σ0))ds+ ∫ t0 w−1s σ0dBs, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. (5.2)
As explained before, our objective is to find a transition point for the process (µσ0t )t∈[0,T ]. A
transition point in this setting is a pair of two space-time points (±ǫ0, t0), which get closer and
closer to (0, 0) as σ0 tends to 0 with the following two properties:
(1) The probability that the process (µσ0t )t∈[0,T ] reaches ±ǫ0 in a time of the same scale as
t0 tends to 1 as σ0 → 0.
(2) Given the fact that the process (µσ0t )t∈[0,T ] hits ±ǫ0 in a time of order t0, the probability
that it escapes away from 0 after the hitting time tends to 1 as σ0 → 0.
For the latter item, we will compare the trajectories of (µσ0t )t∈[0,T ] with the curves
(±γ ∫ t0 w−2s ds)0≤t≤T , for any arbitrary γ ∈ (0, 1). We will show that, with probability
asymptotically equal to 1, (µσ0t )t∈[0,T ] escapes from 0 at a faster rate than any of these
curves.
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Of course, as σ0 → 0, the effect of the common noise vanishes and outside a null event, the
trajectories of (µσ0t )t∈(0,T ] will concentrate on the equilibria A ∈ {−1, 1} in Proposition 3. For
symmetry reasons, the two equilibria will be charged with the same probability. To make it
clear, here is the main result of this section:
Theorem 11. Consider
(
kt :=
∫ t
0 w
−2
s ds
)
t∈[0,T ] ∈ C([0, T ];R). Then, the sequence of laws
(P ◦ (µσ0t )−10≤t≤T )σ0∈(0,1) converges, as σ0 → 0, to
1
2
δ(kt)t∈[0,T ] +
1
2
δ(−kt)t∈[0,T ] .
5.2. A more general framework. We shall prove Theorem 11 as a particular case of a more
general framework. Assume indeed that, for any σ0 ∈ (0, 1), there exists a continuous mapping
θ˜σ0 from [0, T ] × R into [−1, 1] with the following three features:
(A1) There exists a function L from (0,+∞) into itself satisfying
lim
σ0→0
L(σ0) = +∞ and lim
σ0→0
L(σ0)| ln(σ0)|−1/8 = 0,
such that, for any non-negative non-decreasing curve ψ ∈ C([0, T ];R), which is strictly
above the curve t 7→ (rδ − rt)+ on a left-open interval containing [δ, T ],
lim
σ0→0
sup
(t,x)∈[0,T ],|x|≥σ20L(σ0)+ψt
|(θ˜σ0 − θ)(t, x)| = 0.
(A2) For any σ0 > 0, there exist three real-valued continuous adapted processes (µ˜
σ0
t )t∈[0,T ],
(Y˜ σ0t )t∈[0,T ], and (△σ0t )t∈[0,T ], the process (Y˜ σ0t )t∈[0,T ] taking values in [−1, 1], such that
µ˜σ0t = −
∫ t
0
w−2s Y˜
σ0
s ds+ σ0
∫ t
0
w−1s dBs, t ∈ [0, T ],
with
Y˜ σ0t = θ˜
σ0
(
t, µ˜σ0t
)−△σ0t , t ∈ [0, T ],
and supt∈[0,T ] |△σ0t | tends to 0 in probability as σ0 tends to 0.
(A3) For any σ0 > 0, the law of µ˜
σ0 on C([0, T ];R) is the same as the law of −µ˜σ0 .
In this framework, we prove below the following statement:
Theorem 12. Under assumptions (A1), (A2) and (A3), the sequence (P ◦ (µ˜σ0t )−1t∈[0,T ])σ0∈(0,1)
converges, as σ0 tends to 0, to
1
2
δ(kt)t∈[0,T ] +
1
2
δ(−kt)t∈[0,T ] .
It is well checked that Theorem 11 follows from Theorem 12: (A1) is Proposition 9, (A2)
is Lemma 6 and (A3) is a consequence of uniqueness (in law) to (2.4), noticing that the triple
(−µ0,σ0t ,−h0,σ0t , Z0,σ0t )t∈[0,T ] is a solution of the system (2.4) driven by (−Bt)t∈[0,T ].
5.3. Reaching the transition point. Throughout the subsection, we assume that (A1), (A2)
and (A3) hold true. We define our transition point as
(ǫ0, t0) :=
(
σ20L
2(σ0), σ0
)
, (5.3)
where L is as in (A1).
We will regard ǫ0 and t0 as functions of σ0. We call them infinitesimal functions of σ0 in the
sense that they tend to 0 with σ0.
With the transition point, we associate the following hitting time: For all ψ ∈ C([0, T ];R),
consider
τǫ0(ψ) := inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : |ψt| > ǫ0}, (5.4)
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with the convention that τǫ0(ψ) := T when the set in the right-hand side is empty.
Proposition 13. (Transition point). Consider t˜0, a positive infinitesimal function of σ0,
such that lim
σ0→0
t˜0/t0 = +∞. Then,
P
(
τǫ0
(
µ˜σ0
)
> t˜0
)→ 0 as σ0 → 0.
5.3.1. A technical lemma. The proof of Proposition 13 is based upon the following general
lemma:
Lemma 14. For a positive continuous (deterministic) path (wˇt)t∈[0,T ], let (Xˇt)t∈[0,T ] be a one-
dimensional Itoˆ process of the form
dXˇt = −wˇ−2t Yˇtdt+ wˇ−1t dBˇt, t ∈ [0, T ],
where (Bˇt)t∈[0,T ] is a Brownian motion with respect to some filtration (Fˇt)t∈[0,T ] and (Yˇt)t∈[0,T ]
is a [−1, 1]-valued adapted process. For a real a ≥ 1 and some stopping time ̺ with respect to
the filtration (Fˆt)t∈[0,T ], let
τ := inf{t ≥ ̺ : |Xˇt| ≥ a}.
Then, on the event {|Xˇ̺| < a}, we have
P
(
τ ≤ T | Fˇ̺
) ≥ 1
c
exp
(−c(kˇT − kˇ̺)) exp
(
− ca
2
(kˇT − kˇ̺)
)
,
where c is a strictly positive universal constant and
kˇt =
∫ t
0
wˇ−2s ds, t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. Without any loss of generality, we can assume that ̺ = 0. We then let Q be the
probability measure defined by
dQ
dP
= exp
(∫ T
0
Yˇswˇ
−1
s dBˇs −
1
2
∫ T
0
|Yˇs|2wˇ−2s ds
)
.
Under Q, the process
Wˇt = Bˇt −
∫ t
0
wˇ−1s Yˇsds, t ∈ [0, T ],
is a Brownian motion with respect to the filtration (Fˇt)t∈[0,T ]. Moreover,
Xˇt − Xˇ0 =
∫ t
0
wˇ−1s dWˇs, t ∈ [0, T ].
We then obtain
Q
(
sup
t∈[0,T ]
(
Xˇt − Xˇ0
) ≥ a ∣∣ Fˇ0) = Q
(
sup
t∈[0,T ]
[∫ t
0
wˇ−1s dWˇs
]
≥ a ∣∣ Fˇ0
)
= Q
(
sup
t∈[0,T ]
[∫ t
0
wˇ−1s dWˇs
]
≥ a
)
.
Then, by Gaussian estimates, we obtain
Q
(
sup
t∈[0,T ]
(
Xˇt − Xˇ0
) ≥ a ∣∣ Fˇ0) ≥ Q
(∫ T
0
wˇ−1s dWˇs ≥ a
)
≥ 1√
2πkˇT
∫ a+1
a
exp
(− x2
2kˇT
)
dx ≥ 1√
2πkˇT
exp
(−2a2
kˇT
)
.
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Now,
Q
(
sup
t∈[0,T ]
(
Xˇt − Xˇ0
) ≥ a ∣∣ Fˇ0) = EP[dQ
dP
1{supt∈[0,T ](Xˇt−Xˇ0)≥a}
∣∣ Fˇ0]
≤ EP
[(dQ
dP
)2 | Fˇ0]1/2P( sup
t∈[0,T ]
(Xˇt − Xˇ0) ≥ a
∣∣ Fˇ0)1/2.
It is completely standard to prove that
EP
[(dQ
dP
)2 ∣∣ Fˇ0] ≤ exp(2kˇT ).
So, we end up with
P
(
sup
t∈[0,T ]
(
Xˇt − Xˇ0
) ≥ a | Fˇ0)1/2 ≥ 1√
2πkˇT
exp(−kˇT ) exp
(−2a2
kˇT
)
,
which completes the proof on the event Xˇ0 ≥ 0. Changing (Xˇt)t∈[0,T ] into (−Xˇt)t∈[0,T ], we easily
tackle the case when Xˇ0 ≤ 0. 
5.3.2. Proof of Proposition 13.
Proof. Recall by assumption (A2) that
dµ˜σ0t = −w−2t Y˜ σ0t dt+ σ0w−1t dBt, ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
By using the change of variables,
Xˇt := σ
−2
0 µ˜
σ0
σ20t
, Yˇt := Y˜
σ0
σ20t
, wˇt := wσ20t, Bˇt := σ
−1
0 Bσ20t, ∀t ∈ [0, σ
−2
0 T ],
it is well checked that
dXˇt = −wˇ−2t Yˇtdt+ wˇ−1t dBˇt, Xˇ0 = 0, t ∈ [0, σ−20 T ]. (5.5)
Obviously (Bˇt)t∈[0,σ−20 T ] is a Brownian motion and (Xˇt)t∈[0,σ−20 T ] is an Itoˆ process for a common
rescaled filtration (Fˇt)t∈[0,σ−20 T ]. We also let
τˇ(σ0) := inf
{
t ≥ 0 : |Xˇt| ≥ L2(σ0)
}
= σ−20 τǫ0
(
µ˜σ0
)
, inf ∅ = σ−20 T.
We claim that for the same constant c > 0 as in the statement of Lemma 14, it holds, for
any integer i ∈ {0, · · · , N − 1}, with N := ⌊σ−20 ⌋,
P
(
τˇ(σ0) ≥ (i+ 1)
Nσ20
T
∣∣∣∣ τˇ(σ0) > iTNσ20
)
≤ 1− 1
c
exp
(
−cσ−20
(
k (i+1)T
N
− k iT
N
))
exp
(
− cσ
2
0L
4(σ0)
k (i+1)T
N
− k iT
N
)
.
(5.6)
The proof works as follows. We consider the process (Xˇt)t∈[τˇ(σ0)∧ iT
Nσ20
, T
σ20
] and we apply Lemma
14 with ̺ = τˇ (σ0) ∧ iTNσ20 and a = L
2(σ0). On the event {τˇ (σ0) > iTNσ20 }, we get
P
(
τˇ(σ0) ≤ (i+ 1)
Nσ20
T
∣∣∣∣ Fˇτˇ (σ0)∧ iT
Nσ2
0
)
≥ 1
c
exp
(−c(kˇ (i+1)T
Nσ20
− kˇ iT
Nσ2
0
)
)
exp
(
− cL
4(σ0)
(kˇ (i+1)T
Nσ20
− kˇ iT
Nσ2
0
)
)
,
with
kˇt =
∫ t
0
wˇ−2s ds =
∫ t
0
w−2
σ20s
ds = σ−20 kσ20t,
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from which we get (5.6). Using the fact that, for σ0 ∈ (0, 1), 1/N is between σ20 and 2σ20 , we can
change the value of the constant c (allowing c to depend on T and κ) so that
P
(
τˇ(σ0) >
(i+ 1)
Nσ20
T
∣∣∣∣ τˇ(σ0) > iTNσ20
)
≤ 1− 1
c
exp
(
−cL4(σ0)
)
. (5.7)
By iterating (5.7), we deduce that
P
(
τˇ (σ0) >
i
Nσ20
T
)
≤
(
1− 1
c
exp
(−cL4(σ0)))i.
Recall that ln(1− u) ≤ −u for u ∈ [0, 1). Thus,
P
(
τˇ(σ0) >
i
Nσ20
T
)
≤ exp
(
i ln
(
1− 1
c
exp
(−cL4(σ0))))
≤ exp
(
− i
c
exp
(−cL4(σ0))).
(5.8)
Choose i = ⌊σ−10 /(2T )⌋ in (5.8) and deduce that, for σ0 small enough,
P
(
τǫ0
(
µ˜σ0
)
≥ σ0
)
= P
(
τˇ(σ0) ≥ σ−10
)
≤ exp
[
−c′σ−10 exp
(−cL4(σ0))],
for a new constant c′. Since limσ0→0 L4(σ0)| ln(σ0)|−1/2 = 0, the right-hand side tends to 0 with
σ0, which completes the proof.

5.4. Restarting from the transition point. As before, we assume that (A1), (A2) and (A3)
are in force. In order to investigate what happens after τǫ0(µ˜
σ0), we prove first the following
lemma:
Lemma 15. There exists a positive constant cδ ∈ (0, 1), such that, for all γ ∈ (0, cδ),
(1− γ)
∫ t
δ/2
w−2s ds ≥
(
rδ − rt
)
+
+
1
2
(
rδ/2 − rt∧δ
)
, t ∈ [δ
2
, T
]
.
Proof. Define cδ as
0 < cδ :=
∫ δ
δ/2 w
−2
r dr
2
∫ T
0 w
−2
r dr
<
1
2
.
Observe that, whenever γ ∈ (0, cδ),
γ
∫ T
δ/2
w−2r dr ≤
1
2
∫ δ
δ/2
w−2r dr,
and then, for t ∈ [δ, T ],
(1− γ)
∫ t
δ/2
w−2s ds ≥
∫ t
δ/2
w−2s ds−
1
2
∫ δ
δ/2
w−2r dr ≥
∫ t
δ
w−2r dr +
1
2
(
rδ/2 − rδ
)
.
This completes the proof when t ∈ [δ, T ]. Using the fact that cδ ≤ 1/2, the result is obviously
true when t ∈ [δ/2, T ]. 
The above lemma prompts us to introduce (for the same function L as in (5.3))
τ+γ (σ0) := inf
{
t ∈ [τǫ0(µ˜σ0), T ] : µ˜σ0t < σ20L(σ0) + (1− γ)
∫ t
τǫ0 (µ˜
σ0 )
w−2s ds
}
, (5.9)
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with the convention that τ+γ (σ0) := T if the set is empty. Similarly, we let
τ−γ (σ0) = inf
{
t ∈ [τǫ0(µ˜σ0), T ] : µ˜σ0t > −σ20L(σ0)− (1− γ)
∫ t
τǫ0 (µ˜
σ0 )
w−2s ds
}
. (5.10)
Proposition 16. For any γ ∈ (0, cδ), it holds that
P
(
τ+γ (σ0) < T, µ˜
σ0
τǫ0 (µ˜
σ0 ) = ǫ0
)
→ 0, as σ0 → 0,
and
P
(
τ−γ (σ0) < T, µ˜
σ0
τǫ0 (µ˜
σ0 )
= −ǫ0
)
→ 0, as σ0 → 0.
Proof. Consider σ0 ∈ (0, 1) and call t˜0 an infinitesimal function as in the statement of Proposition
13. By Proposition 13, by assumption (A2) in Subsection 5.2 and by symmetry, it suffices to
prove that
P
(
τ+γ (σ0) < T, τǫ0
(
µ˜σ0
) ≤ t˜0, µ˜σ0τǫ0 (µ˜σ0 ) = ǫ0, supt∈[0,T ] |△σ0t | ≤
γ
4
)
→ 0, as σ0 → 0.
First step. Throughout the step, we work on the event {τ+γ (σ0) < T, τǫ0
(
µ˜σ0
) ≤ t˜0, µ˜σ0τǫ0 (µ˜σ0 ) =
ǫ0, supt∈[0,T ] |△σ0t | ≤ γ/4}. So, for σ0 small enough such that t˜0 ≤ δ/2 and L(σ0) ≥ 2, we deduce
from Lemma 15 that, for all t ∈ [τǫ0(µ˜σ0), τ+γ (σ0)],
µ˜σ0t ≥ σ20L(σ0) + (1− γ)1t≥δ/2
∫ t
δ/2
w−2s ds > σ
2
0L(σ0) +
(
rδ − rt
)
+
+
1
2
(
rδ/2 − rt∧δ
)
+
.
We deduce the following two things. First,
θ
(
t, µ˜σ0t
)
= −sign(µ˜σ0t ) = −1, ∀t ∈ [τǫ0(µ˜σ0), τ+γ (σ0)]. (5.11)
Moreover, for all t ∈ [τǫ0(µ˜σ0), τ+γ (σ0)], the point µ˜σ0t lies in the domain of application of as-
sumption (A1) in Subsection 5.2, which yields∣∣Ψ˜(t, µ˜σ0t , σ0)∣∣ ≤ γ/4, t ∈ [τǫ0(µ˜σ0), τ+γ (σ0)], (5.12)
whenever σ0 > 0 is sufficiently small (uniformly in t), and where we let Ψ˜(t, x, σ0) = θ˜
σ0(t, x)−
θ(t, x).
Hence, for sufficiently small σ0 > 0 such that claims (5.11) and (5.12) both hold, we observe
from (A2) that, for all t ∈ [τǫ0(µ˜σ0), τ+γ (σ0)],
µ˜σ0t ≥ µ˜σ0τǫ0 (µ˜σ0 ) −
∫ t
τǫ0 (µ˜
σ0 )
w−2s
(
θ
(
s, µ˜σ0s
)
+ Ψ˜
(
s, µ˜σ0s , σ0
)−△σ0s )ds+ σ0
∫ t
τǫ0 (µ˜
σ0 )
w−1s dBs
≥ ǫ0 + (1− γ/2)
∫ t
τǫ0 (µ˜
σ0 )
w−2s ds+ σ0
∫ t
τǫ0 (µ˜
σ0 )
w−1s dBs.
Second step. We work on the same event as in the first step. To simplify notation, let us
write τ = τ+γ (σ0) and observe that (recall that we assumed τ < T )
µ˜σ0τ = σ
2
0L(σ0) + (1− γ)
∫ τ
τǫ0 (µ˜
σ0 )
w−2s ds.
By the conclusion of the previous step, we deduce that there exists r ∈ [τǫ0(µ˜σ0), T ] such that
σ20L(σ0) + (1− γ)
∫ r
τǫ0 (µ˜
σ0 )
w−2s ds ≥ ǫ0 + (1− γ/2)
∫ r
τǫ0 (µ˜
σ0 )
w−2s ds+ σ0
∫ r
τǫ0 (µ˜
σ0 )
w−1s dBs.
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Therefore, on the same event as in the first step, there exists r ∈ [τǫ0(µ˜σ0), T ] such that
σ−10
∫ r
τǫ0 (µ˜
σ0 )
w−1s dBs + σ
−2
0 (γ/2)
∫ r
τǫ0 (µ˜
σ0 )
w−2s ds ≤ L(σ0)
(
1− L(σ0)
)
=: v(σ0).
We deduce that the event {τ+γ (σ0) < T, τǫ0
(
µ˜σ0
) ≤ t˜0, µ˜σ0τǫ0 (µ˜σ0 ) = ǫ0, supt∈[0,T ] |△σ0t | ≤ γ/4} is
included in the event{
sup
r∈[τǫ0 (µ˜σ0 ),T ]
exp
(
−γσ−10
∫ r
τǫ0 (µ˜
σ0 )
w−1s dBs −
1
2
σ−20 γ
2
∫ r
τǫ0 (µ˜
σ0 )
w−2s ds
)
≥ exp(−γv(σ0))
}
.
Third step. It remains to prove that
P
(
sup
r∈[τǫ0 (µ˜σ0 ),T ]
exp
(
−γσ−10
∫ r
τǫ0 (µ˜
σ0 )
w−1s dBs −
1
2
σ−20 γ
2
∫ r
τǫ0 (µ˜
σ0 )
w−2s ds
)
≥ exp(−γv(σ0))
)
→ 0,
as σ0 tends to 0. This is a simple consequence of Doob’s maximal inequality for the martingale(
exp
(
−γσ−10
∫ t∨τǫ0 (µ˜σ0 )
τǫ0 (µ˜
σ0 )
w−1s dBs −
1
2
σ−20 γ
2
∫ t∨τǫ0 (µ˜σ0 )
τǫ0 (µ˜
σ0 )
w−2s ds
))
t∈[0,T ]
,
and of the fact that v(σ0)→ −∞. 
5.5. Conclusion of the proof of Theorem 12.
Proof. First step. It is easily checked that the sequence (P◦(µ˜σ0t )−1t∈[0,T ])σ0>0 is tight on C([0, T ];R).
Also, by (A2), we deduce that, for any limiting point P∞, the canonical process (ψt)t∈[0,T ] on
C([0, T ];R) satisfies |ψt| ≤ kt for all t ∈ [0, T ], with probability 1 under P∞.
Second step. In order to proceed further, we need new notation. For t ∈ [0, δ/2], we let
F (t) := {ψ ∈ C([0, T ];R) : ψs ≥ ks − kt, s ∈ [t, T ]} and, for any ǫ > 0, F ǫ(t) := {ψ ∈
C([0, T ];R) : ψs ≥ ks − kt − ǫ, s ∈ [t, T ]}. Obviously, F (t) and F ǫ(t) are closed subsets of
C([0, T ];R).
We claim that for any limit point P∞ of the sequence (P ◦ (µ˜σ0s )−1s∈[0,T ])σ0>0, it holds
P∞
({
ψ ∈ C([0, T ];R) : ψ ∈ F (0)} ∪ {ψ ∈ C([0, T ];R) : −ψ ∈ F (0)}) = 1.
Below, we merely write F (0) ∪ (−F (0)) for {ψ ∈ C([0, T ];R) : ψ ∈ F (0)} ∪ {ψ ∈ C([0, T ];R) :
−ψ ∈ F (0)}.
We apply Proposition 16. For a given γ > 0, it says that
lim
σ0→0
P
({
τ+γ (σ0) = T, µ˜
σ0
τǫ0 (µ˜
σ0 ) = ǫ0
} ∪ {τ−γ (σ0) = T, µ˜σ0τǫ0 (µ˜σ0 ) = −ǫ0}
)
= 1.
Take t ∈ (0, δ/2) and fix ǫ > 0. On the event {τǫ0(µ˜σ0) ≤ t} ∩ {τ+γ (σ0) = T, µ˜σ0τǫ0 (µ˜σ0 ) = ǫ0}, we
have
µ˜σ0s ≥ (1− γ)
(
ks − kt
)
, s ∈ [t, T ],
and, for γ small enough,
µ˜σ0s ≥ ks − kt − ǫ, s ∈ [t, T ],
Therefore, on the event {τǫ0(µ˜σ0) ≤ t} ∩ {τ+γ (σ0) = T, µ˜σ0τǫ0 (µ˜σ0 ) = ǫ0}, (µ˜
σ0
s )s∈[0,T ] ∈ F ǫ(t).
Then, Proposition 13 says that
lim
σ0→0
P
(
(µ˜σ0s )s∈[0,T ] ∈ F ǫ(t) ∪ (−F ǫ(t))
)
= 1.
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Since F ǫ(t) ∪ (−F ε(t)) is closed, we get, by the portmanteau theorem, that, for all t ∈ [0, δ/2]
and ǫ > 0,
P∞
(
F ǫ(t) ∪ (−F ǫ(t))) = 1.
Intersecting over all the positive and rational reals ǫ, we get:
P∞
(
F (t) ∪ (−F (t))) = 1.
Intersecting over all the rational reals t ∈ [0, δ/2], we deduce the announced claim.
Conclusion. By the first and second steps, the canonical process (ψt)t∈[0,T ] on C([0, T ];R)
must satisfy
P∞
(
{ψt = kt, t ∈ [0, T ]} ∪ {ψt = −kt, t ∈ [0, T ]}
)
= 1.
By (A3), ψ and −ψ have the same law under P∞. We deduce that
P∞
(
ψt = kt, t ∈ [0, T ]
)
= P∞
(
ψt = −kt, t ∈ [0, T ]
)
=
1
2
,
which completes the proof. 
6. N-player limit selection
We now come to the last method of selection. As shown in Subsection 6.1, we can indeed
associate with our particular LQ-MFG a game with a finite number of players and then address
the asymptotic form of the equilibria (if any) as the number of players tends to ∞. In fact, the
connection between mean-field games and games with finitely many players is a major question
in the theory of mean-field games, see for instance the references [40, 5, 8, 9, 21, 34, 33].
Below, we prove that, for a finite number N of players, Nash equilibria (if any) solve a
forward-backward stochastic particle system. The goal is thus to address the asymptotic form,
under the limit N → ∞, of the solution to this particle system and to see which equilibria of
the LQ-MFG (2.5) are charged by the weak limits (if any).
Basically, the main result that we show in this section is that the equilibria that are selected
in this way are the same as those obtained in the previous section.
6.1. The associated N-players games. In this paragraph, we formulate the version with
finitely many players of the mean-field game we have been considering so far. As already
explained in introduction, the fact that the mean-field game has a counterpart in the form of a
stochastic differential game with a finite number of players is not a big surprise: This connection
is pretty standard and, in fact, it is the basis of the whole theory of mean-field games, see the
aforementioned references.
The striking fact in the game with finitely many players we address below is that each player
is driven by its own Brownian motion. In other words, noises are independent; they are said to
be idiosyncratic.
So, for the description of the game, we consider an integer N ∈ N∗, which stands for
the number of players in the game. Then, for the same time horizon as before, we call
(W it ; i = 1, ..., N)t∈[0,T ] a collection of N independent one dimensional Brownian motions de-
fined on a (common) complete filtered probability space (Ω,F ,P). We call (Fˆt)t∈[0,T ] the usual
augmentation of the filtration generated by ((W it )t∈[0,T ] ; i = 1, ..., N ).
Also σ > 0 and κ ∈ R are the same constants as in the system (2.1), and g : R → R is
the Lipschitz continuous and bounded function we defined earlier. Importantly, σ0 is 0 in this
paragraph: There is no common noise; but somehow, we show below that there is an intrinsic
common noise of variance σ0 = σN
−1/2 in the system. We will insist repeatedly on this fact
which will serve us as a guideline.
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Formulation of the game. For all i = 1, ..., N , the evolution of ith player’s state during the game
is described by the real-valued process (Xit)t∈[0,T ]. Noticeably, player i sees the other players
through an aggregate quantity, which is here given by the average of the states of all these other
players, namely
µi,Nt :=
1
N − 1
N∑
j 6=i
Xjt , ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
Of course, the fact that interactions are designed in such a way is the cornerstone for explaining
the mean-field structure we addressed in Scheme 1.
Remark 17. In some of the articles on the subject, authors include in the definition of the
empirical measure the own state of player i, in which case µi,Nt becomes independent of i and
writes
µNt =
1
N
N∑
j=1
Xjt .
As explained in [9, Chapter 6], the limiting game should be the same. Still, we here work with
the first form of the empirical measure as it is more convenient for our own purposes.
Player i has the following dynamics:{
dXit = [κX
i
t + α
i
t]dt+ σdW
i
t , ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
Xi0 = 0,
(6.1)
where (αit)t∈[0,T ] is a control process belonging to the space Hˆ2 of (Fˆt)t∈[0,T ]-progressively mea-
surable processes (αt)t∈[0,T ] satisfying
E
[ ∫ T
0
|αt|2dt
]
<∞.
Given the tuple of controls (α1t , · · · , αNt )t∈[0,T ], we associate with player i the following cost
functional:
J i(α1, · · · , αi, · · · , αN ) := E
[∫ T
0
1
2
[
(αit)
2 +
(
Xit
)2]
dt+
1
2
(
XiT + g(µ
i,N
T )
)2]
. (6.2)
We then recall the following standard definition:
Definition 18. We call (α1t , · · · , αNt )t∈[0,T ] a Nash equilibrium if, for any i ∈ {1, · · · , N} and
any other process (βt)t∈[0,T ],
J i(α1, · · · , αi−1, β, αi+1, · · · , αN ) ≥ J i(α1, · · · , αi−1, αi, αi+1, · · · , αN ).
In other words, a Nash equilibrium is a consensus between the players: None of them can
be better off by deviating unilaterally from the consensus.
It must be emphasized that the definition given above is restricted to so-called equilib-
ria over controls in open-loop form: When player i changes her/his own strategy, the others
keep playing the same realizations of ((αjt )t∈[0,T ] ; j 6= i). This is contrast with equilibria over
controls in Markovian closed loop form, which are addressed in the PDE literature: Equilib-
ria over controls in Markovian closed loop form are in the form (α¯j(t,X1t , · · · ,XNt ))t∈[0,T ], for
j = 1, · · · , N , for functions α¯j : [0, T ] × RN → R; whenever player i deviates, she/he chooses
another feedback function β¯ : [0, T ]×RN → R instead of α¯i while the others keep using α¯j ; still,
as the values of the state process (Xit)t∈[0,T ] change, the realizations of the control processes
((α¯j(t,X1t , · · · ,XNt ))t∈[0,T ] ; j 6= i) change as well. We refer to [8, Chapter 2] for a review.
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We shall not address the case of equilibria over controls in Markovian closed loop form in
the text, but this could make sense as well.
First order condition. Similar to (2.4) (for mean-field games), we can write down a first order
condition for the Nash equilibria of the game (6.1)–(6.2) in the form of a system of forward-
backward stochastic differential equations. This is the cornerstone of our selection result. Again,
we refer to [8, Chapter 2] for details on the derivation of this forward-backward system.
The first order condition writes as follows. Any Nash equilibrium to the associated N -player
game (6.1)–(6.2) is in the set of solutions of the following system of forward-backward SDEs:

dXit =
[
κXit − Y it
]
dt+ σdW it , ∀t ∈ [0, T ], Xi0 = 0.
dY it =
[−Xit − κY it ]dt+∑Nk=1 Zi,kt dW kt , ∀t ∈ [0, T ], Y iT = XiT + g(µi,NT ),
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}.
(6.3)
In other words, the state processes of any Nash equilibrium must coincide with the forward
paths of some solution to the above system.
Below, we do not discuss whether (6.3) is a sufficient condition or not. Usually, it is known
to be sufficient in the case when the coefficients of the cost functional (6.2) are convex, but the
latter is not true here.
Following our strategy for solving the system (2.4), we search for a solution (Xit , Y
i
t , Z
i,k
t ; i, k =
1, 2, ..., N)t∈[0,T ] to the FBSDE (6.3) in the form Y it = ηtXit + V it for all i = 1, 2, ..., N and
t ∈ [0, T ], where
dV it = χ
i
tdt+
N∑
k=1
zi,kt dW
k
t , V
i
T = g(µ
i,N
T ).
In fact, we can show that there is a solution (Xit , Y
i
t , Z
i,k
t ; i, k = 1, 2, ..., N)t∈[0,T ] to FBSDE
(6.3) if and only if we can construct a solution (Xit , V
i
t , z
i,k
t ; i, k = 1, 2, ..., N)t∈[0,T ] to FBSDE
(6.4) below:

dXit =
[
(κ− ηt)Xit − V it
]
dt+ σdW it , ∀t ∈ [0, T ], Xi0 = 0.
dV it = −(κ− ηt)V it dt+
∑N
k=1 z
i,k
t dW
k
t , ∀t ∈ [0, T ], V iT = g(µi,NT ),
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N},
dηt
dt = η
2
t − 2κηt − 1, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], ηT = 1.
(6.4)
The connection between (6.3) to (6.4) is given by the change of variable (Y it = ηtX
i
t + V
i
t ; i =
1, ..., N)t∈[0,T ]. In fact, by a new (straightforward) change of variable in the forward component,
we can even remove the Xi dependence in the drift of the forward equation. By [16], we deduce
that (6.4) is uniquely solvable. Hence, (6.3) is uniquely solvable as well as. Although this does
not show the existence of a Nash equilibrium to theN -player game, this shows that the first order
condition is always uniquely satisfied, which suffices for our purposes: Below, we investigate the
asymptotic behavior of the solution to (6.3) as N tends to +∞.
Recall now that wt = exp(−
∫ T
t (κ − ηs)ds) and define the rescaled average players’ states
(over all the players):
µ˜Nt =
w−1t
N
N∑
i=1
Xit , v
N
t =
wt
N
N∑
i=1
V it , for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Therefore, when there exists a Nash equilibrium to the associated N -player game, the process
(µ˜Nt , v
N
t )t∈[0,T ] is a solution to (use the fact that w
−1
T = 1)
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

∀t ∈ [0, T ],
dµ˜Nt = −w−2t vNt dt+ σN
∑N
i=1w
−1
t dW
i
t , µ˜
N
0 = 0,
(vNt )t∈[0,T ] is a continuous martingale, vNT =
1
N
∑N
i=1 g(µ˜
i,N
T ),
(6.5)
where
µ˜i,Nt =
w−1t
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
Xjt .
Main statement. Here is now our main statement:
Theorem 19. Consider
(
kt :=
∫ t
0 w
−2
s ds
)
t∈[0,T ] ∈ C([0, T ];R). The sequence (P◦(µ˜Nt )−10≤t≤T )N≥1
converges, as N →∞, to
1
2
δ(kt)t∈[0,T ] +
1
2
δ(−kt)t∈[0,T ] .
Of course, it says that the equilibria that are selected in Proposition 3 are the same as those
selected in Theorem 11.
6.2. Approximate decoupling field. The problem with (6.5) is that the terminal condition
is not in the form of a function of µNT . Still, what we expect is that the solution to (6.5) should
get closer and closer (as N tends to∞) to the solution of the same system but with the terminal
boundary condition
vNT =
1
N
N∑
i=1
g(µ˜NT ) = g(µ˜
N
T ),
namely (we put a hat on the symbols to distinguish from (6.5))

∀t ∈ [0, T ],
dµˆNt = −w−2t vˆNt dt+ σN
∑N
i=1 w
−1
t dW
i
t , µˆ
N
0 = 0,
(vˆNt )t∈[0,T ] is a continuous martingale, vˆNT = g(µˆ
N
T ).
(6.6)
Letting
Bt =
1√
N
N∑
i=1
W it , t ∈ [0, T ], (6.7)
we then recover (2.4) and (Bt)t∈[0,T ], which is a Brownian motion with respect to (Fˆt)t∈[0,T ],
plays the role of a common noise with intensity σ0 = σN
−1/2! (This explains why we require
σ > 0 in this section.)
However, this does not work so easily since (6.6) and (6.5) do not coincide. So, we pay some
price below to estimate the distance between the solutions of the two systems.
Comparison argument. The main difficulty to compare (6.6) and (6.5) is the fact that, as N
tends to ∞, the system (6.6) becomes ill-posed. So, we cannot expect for robust stability
properties, uniformly in the parameter N , to estimate the difference between the solutions of
the two equations.
The strategy we use below is based upon a comparison principle. As shown by Lemma 10,
a form of comparison should be indeed in force independently of the value of N .
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In order to put things in order, we recall that rδ =
∫ T
δ w
−2
s ds and we consider a sequence of
positive real numbers (γN )N≥1 ⊆ (0, rδ/2) such that γN → 0 as N → +∞. We then define the
Lipschitz continuous non-increasing function
g˜N (x) :=


g(x), if x ≤ rδ − 2γN ,
g(rδ − 2γN ) if rδ − 2γN ≤ x ≤ rδ − γN ,
g(x− γN ) if rδ − γN ≤ x ≤ rδ + γN ,
g(x) = g(rδ) if x ≥ rδ + γN .
(6.8)
We then have the following lemma:
Lemma 20. The functions g and g˜N satisfy
g˜N ≥ g and
∫ +∞
−∞
(g˜N − g)(x)dx = 2γ
2
N
rδ
.
Proof. The inequality g˜N ≥ g is a consequence of the fact that g is non-increasing. As for the
second part of the statement, we have∫ +∞
−∞
(g˜N − g)(x)dx =
∫ rδ+γN
rδ−2γN
(g˜N − g)(x)dx
=
∫ rδ−γN
rδ−2γN
x− rδ + 2γN
rδ
dx+
∫ rδ
rδ−γN
γN
rδ
dx+
∫ rδ+γN
rδ
rδ − x+ γN
rδ
dx
= 2
γ2N
rδ
.

Following (4.1), we can associate with g and g˜N the functions θN and θ˜N in C1,2([0, T );R)∩
C([0, T ] × R;R), classical solutions to

∂tθ˜
N
t − w−2t θ˜N∂xθ˜N + 12(σ
2
N )w
−2
t ∂
2
xxθ˜
N = 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ), ∀x ∈ R,
∂tθ
N
t − w−2t θN∂xθN + 12(σ
2
N )w
−2
t ∂
2
xxθ
N = 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ), ∀x ∈ R,
θ˜N(T, x) = g˜N (x), θN (T, x) = g(x), ∀x ∈ R.
(6.9)
Then, thanks to Lemma 10, we have θ˜N ≥ θN and
0 ≤
∫ +∞
−∞
(θ˜N − θN)(t, x)dx ≤
∫ +∞
−∞
(g˜N − g)(t, x)dx = 2γ
2
N
rδ
, for all t ∈ [0, T ]. (6.10)
Comparison between vN and θ˜N . Recall the process (kt =
∫ t
0 w
−2
s ds)t∈[0,T ]. Here is our main
comparison result:
Lemma 21. Choose (γN )N≥1 in (6.8) such that
γN
√
N → +∞ as N → +∞.
Then, with probability 1,
−vNt ≥ −θ˜N(t, µNt ) +△Nt , for all t ∈ [0, T ],
where
lim
N→+∞
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣△Nt ∣∣2] = 0.
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Proof. First step. For all i = 1, 2, ..., N , we can quantify the distance between µ˜NT and µ˜
i,N
T as
follows:
|µ˜NT − µ˜i,NT | =
1
N
|X˜iT − µ˜i,NT |,
where (X˜it := w
−1
t X
i
t , V˜
i
t := wtV
i
t )t∈[0,T ] solves
dX˜it = −w−2t V˜ it dt+ σw−1t dW it .
Therefore,
d
(
X˜it − µ˜i,Nt
)
= −w−2t
(
V˜ it −
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
V˜ jt
)
dt+ σ
(
w−1t dW
i
t −
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
w−1t dW
j
t
)
.
Obviously, (V˜ it )t∈[0,T ] is a martingale with a terminal boundary condition that belongs to [−1, 1].
Therefore,
|µ˜NT − µ˜i,NT | ≤
1
N
[
2kT + σ
(∣∣∣∣
∫ T
0
w−1s dW
i
s
∣∣∣∣+ 1N − 1
N∑
j 6=i
∣∣∣∣
∫ T
0
w−1s dW
j
s
∣∣∣∣
)]
≤ 2
N
[
kT + σ max
i∈{1,...,N}
∣∣∣∣
∫ T
0
w−1s dW
i
s
∣∣∣∣
]
.
Second step. By a straightforward application of Itoˆ’s formula, we obtain
d
(
vNt − θ˜N(t, µ˜Nt )
)
= w−2t ∂xθ˜
N (t, µ˜Nt )
(
vNt − θ˜N(t, µ˜Nt )
)
dt+ dMt,
where (Mt)t∈[0,T ] is a square integrable martingale. Therefore,
vNt − θ˜N (t, µ˜Nt ) = E
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
t
w−2s ∂xθ˜
N(s, µ˜Ns )ds
)[
vNT − g˜N (µ˜NT )
]∣∣∣∣∣Fˆt
]
for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Now, following Lemma 7, we know that there exists a positive constant C, independent of N ,
such that
|∂xθ˜N (s, µ˜Ns )| ≤ CN for all s ∈ [0, T ).
Therefore, by letting AN := {maxi∈{1,...,N} |
∫ T
0 w
−1
s dW
i
s | ≤ C
√
N}, we get
−vNt ≥ −θ˜N(t, µ˜Nt ) +△Nt
+ E
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
t
w−2s ∂xθ˜
N(s, µ˜Ns )ds
)[
g˜N (µ˜NT )− vNT
]
1AN
∣∣∣∣∣Fˆt
]
,
(6.11)
for all t ∈ [0, T ], with
|△Nt | ≤ E
[
exp(CN)
∣∣vNT − g˜N (µ˜NT )∣∣1A∁N
∣∣∣∣∣Fˆt
]
≤ 2 exp(CN)P
(
max
i∈{1,...,N}
∣∣∣∣
∫ T
0
w−1s dW
i
s
∣∣∣∣ > C√N
∣∣∣∣Fˆt
)
.
By standard Gaussian estimates, we notice that, for a constant c depending on kT , but inde-
pendent of C,
max
i∈{1,...,N}
P
(∣∣∣∣
∫ T
0
w−1s dW
i
s
∣∣∣∣ > C√N
)
≤ 1
c
exp
(−C2N
c
)
,
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and then
P
(
max
i∈{1,...,N}
∣∣∣∣
∫ T
0
w−1s dW
i
s
∣∣∣∣ > C√N
)
≤ N
c
exp
(−C2N
c
)
.
Hence, for any p ≥ 1
exp(CpN)P
(
max
i∈{1,...,N}
∣∣∣∣
∫ T
0
w−1s dW
i
s
∣∣∣∣ > C√N
)
≤ N
c
exp
(
CN
(
p− C
c
))
.
Choosing C large enough, we deduce from Doob’s inequality that
lim
N→+∞
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|△Nt |2
]
= 0.
Third step. From inequality (6.11) above, it is sufficient to show that g˜N (µ˜NT )− vNT ≥ 0 on
the event AN .
We thus return to the conclusion of the first step and we notice that, on the event AN , for
all i = 1, 2, ..., N ,
|µ˜NT − µ˜i,NT | ≤
2
N
[
kT + σ max
i∈{1,...,N}
∣∣∣∣
∫ T
0
w−1s dW
i
s
∣∣∣∣
]
≤ cC√
N
,
for a new value of the constant c.
Recall now from (6.8) that γN ∈ (0, rδ/2).
Case a. Suppose that µ˜NT < rδ − cC√N . Then, µ˜
i,N
T < rδ (for all i ∈ {1, · · · , N}) and by
concavity of g for values less than or equal to rδ, we obtain
vNT =
1
N
N∑
i=1
g(µ˜i,NT ) ≤ g(µ˜NT ) ≤ g˜N (µ˜NT ).
Case b. Suppose that µ˜NT > rδ +
cC√
N
. Then, µ˜i,NT > rδ (for all i ∈ {1, · · · , N}), and we
obtain
vNT =
1
N
N∑
i=1
g(µ˜i,NT ) = −1 = g(µ˜NT ) ≤ g˜N (µ˜NT ).
Case c. Suppose that rδ − cC√N ≤ µ˜NT ≤ rδ +
cC√
N
. Then, µ˜NT − 2cC√N ≤ µ˜
i,N
T ≤ µ˜NT + 2cC√N (for
all i ∈ {1, · · · , N}), since g is non-increasing, we obtain, if γN ≥ 2cC/
√
N ,
0 = g˜N (µ˜NT )− g
(
µ˜NT − γN
) ≤ g˜N (µ˜NT )− g
(
µ˜NT −
2cC√
N
)
≤ g˜N (µ˜NT )−
1
N
N∑
i=1
g(µ˜i,NT ) = g˜
N (µ˜NT )− vNT .
The proof is complete. 
Comparison between θ˜N and θN . Similar to Lemma 8, the first point is to notice that θ˜N is
non-increasing and that θN is also non-increasing.
Lemma 22. For any fixed N ≥ 1, the functions θN and θ˜N are non-increasing in the space
argument.
We make use of the non-increasing property to get the following crucial estimate:
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Lemma 23. We can choose (γN )N≥1 in (6.8) such that
γN → 0, γN
√
N → +∞, as N → +∞,
and then find a sequence (ℓN )N≥1 such that
ℓN → +∞, ℓN | ln(N)|−1/8 = 0 as N → +∞,
and so that, for any non-negative non-decreasing curve ψ ∈ C([0, T ];R), which is strictly above
the curve t 7→ (rδ − rt)+ on a left-open interval containing [δ, T ], it holds that
lim
N→+∞
sup
(t,x)∈[0,T ],|x|≥ℓN/N+ψt
|(θ˜N − θ)(t, x)| = 0.
Proof. Take ψ as in the statement. then, it is worth noticing that, for the prescribed values of
(t, x) in the supremum, θ(t, x) = −sign(x).
Without any loss of generality, we can reduce the supremum to positive x’s. Hence, it suffices
to prove that
lim
N→+∞
sup
(t,x)∈[0,T ],x≥ℓN/N+ψt
|1 + θ˜N(t, x)| = 0.
For a sequence (ℓN )N≥1 such that
ℓN → +∞, ℓN | ln(N)|−1/8 = 0 as N → +∞,
choose (γN = ℓ
1/4
N N
−1/2)N≥1 in (6.8). By (6.10), we know that, for any t ∈ [0, T ],
−
∫ ℓNN−1+ψt
ℓ
1/2
N N
−1+ψt
θ˜N(t, x)dx ≥ −
∫ ℓNN−1+ψt
ℓ
1/2
N N
−1+ψt
θN(t, x)dx − 2ℓ
1/2
N
rδN
.
Hence, by Lemma 22, for any t ∈ [0, T ] and any x ≥ ℓNN−1 + ψt,
− θ˜N(t, x) ≥ −θ˜N(t, ℓNN−1 + ψt) ≥ −θN(t, ℓ1/2N N−1 + ψt)− 2ℓ
1/2
N
rδ(ℓN − ℓ1/2N )
. (6.12)
We now recall Proposition 9, from which we deduce
lim
N→+∞
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣1 + θN(t, ℓ1/2N N−1 + ψt)∣∣ = 0.
This completes the proof. 
6.3. Proof of Theorem 19.
Proof. It suffices to invoke Theorem 12 (indexing the sequence of measures by N instead of σ0).
(A1) is a consequence of Lemma 23. (A2) follows from the system (6.6) and Lemma 21. (A3) is
a consequence of uniqueness (in law) to (6.4), noticing that ((−Xit ,−V it , zi,kt )t∈[0,T ])i,k=1,··· ,N is
a solution of the system (6.4) driven by (−W 1t , · · · ,−WNt )t∈[0,T ]. 
7. Appendix: Proof of Proposition 9
Consider σ0 ∈ (0, 1) and (t, x) ∈ [0, δ) × R with |x| ≤ rt − rδ. It is easily checked (using a
change of variable) that θσ0 is odd in x and, thus, that Ψ is also odd in x. Therefore, we can
just focus on Ψ(t, x, σ0) for x > 0.
To simplify notation, we write λ := σ−20 ∈ (1,+∞), so that obtaining asymptotic expressions
as σ0 → 0 is equivalent to obtaining asymptotic expressions as λ → +∞. We also use the
definitions:
g(y) := − y
rδ
1|y|≤rδ − sign(y)1|y|>rδ , h(y) := −
∫ y
0
g(v)dv − (x− y)
2
2rt
,
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and
erf(y) :=
2√
π
∫ y
0
exp
(−v2)dv,
for (t, y) ∈ [0, T )× R.
Lastly, throughout the proof, we use the generic notation Q(y) for a polynomial function of
y of degree less than or equal to 1. Possibly, Q may depend on (t, x).
Preliminary computation: For every (t, x) as above, we define y¯ := −xrδrt−rδ , y
∗
1 := x − rt,
y∗2 := x+rt. It holds that y
∗
1 is a global maximum of h on (−∞,−y¯) and y∗2 is a global maximum
of h on (y¯,+∞). Indeed,
h′(y) = −1 + x− y
rt
> −1 + x− y
∗
1
rt
= 0, for all y ∈ (−∞, y∗1),
h′(y) = −1 + x− y
rt
< −1 + x− y
∗
1
rt
= 0, for all y ∈ (y∗1 ,−rδ),
h′(y) = y
(
rt − rδ
rtrδ
)
+
x
rt
< y¯
(
rt − rδ
rtrδ
)
+
x
rt
= 0, for all y ∈ (−rδ, y¯),
h′(y) = y
(
rt − rδ
rtrδ
)
+
x
rt
> y¯
(
rt − rδ
rtrδ
)
+
rδ − rt
rt
= 0, for all y ∈ (y¯, rδ),
h′(y) = 1 +
x− y
rt
> 1 +
x− y∗2
rt
= 0, for all y ∈ (rδ, y∗2),
h′(y) = 1 +
x− y
rt
< 1 +
x− y∗2
rt
= 0, for all y ∈ (y∗2,+∞).
Now, for a polynomial function of order less than or equal to 1, we compute∫ ∞
−∞
Q(y) exp(λh(y))dy
=
∫ −rδ
−∞
Q(y) exp(λh(y))dy +
∫ rδ
−rδ
Q(y) exp(λh(y))dy +
∫ +∞
rδ
Q(y) exp(λh(y))dy
=
∫ −rδ−y∗1
−∞
Q(u+ y∗1) exp(λh(u+ y
∗
1))du+
∫ rδ
−rδ
Q(y) exp(λh(y))dy
+
∫ +∞
rδ−y∗2
Q(u+ y∗2) exp(λh(u+ y
∗
2))du.
We have
∀u ∈ (−∞,−rδ − y∗1), h(u+ y∗1)− h(y∗1) = −
∫ y∗1
u+y∗1
y∗1 − z
rt
dz = − u
2
2rt
< 0,
∀u ∈ (rδ − y∗2,+∞), h(u+ y∗2)− h(y∗2) =
∫ u+y∗2
y∗2
y∗2 − z
rt
dz = − u
2
2rt
< 0.
Now, letting
B1 := −rδ + y
∗
1√
2rt
= −x+ rδ − rt√
2rt
=
rt − rδ − x√
2rt
≥ 0,
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we have ∫ −rδ−y∗1
−∞
Q(u+ y∗1) exp(λh(u+ y
∗
1))du
= exp
(
λh(y∗1)
) ∫ −rδ−y∗1
−∞
(
Q(y∗1) +Q
′(y∗1)u
)
exp(−λu
2
2rt
)du
=
√
2rt exp
(
λh(y∗1)
) ∫ B1
−∞
(
Q(y∗1) +
√
2rtQ
′(y∗1)s
)
exp(−λs2)ds
=
√
2rt exp
(
λh(y∗1)
)(
Q(y∗1)
√
π
4
erf(
√
λB1) + 1√
λ
−Q′(y∗1)
√
2rt
2λ
exp(−λB21)
)
= exp
(
λh(y∗1)
)
Q(y∗1)
√
πrt
2
erf(
√
λB1) + 1√
λ
− exp(λh(y∗1))Q′(y∗1)rtλ exp(−λB21).
Similarly, letting letting
B2 :=
rδ − y∗2√
2rt
=
rδ − rt − x√
2rt
= −rt − rδ + x√
2rt
≤ 0,
we have ∫ +∞
rδ−y∗2
Q(u+ y∗2) exp(λh(u+ y
∗
2))du
= exp
(
λh(y∗2)
)
Q(y∗2)
√
πrt
2
1− erf(√λB2)√
λ
+ exp
(
λh(y∗2)
)
Q′(y∗2)
rt
λ
exp(−λB22).
Therefore,∫ ∞
−∞
Q(y) exp(λh(y))dy = exp(λh(y∗1))Q(y
∗
1)
√
πrt
2
(
erf(
√
λB1) + 1
)
√
λ
+ exp(λh(y∗2))Q(y
∗
2)
√
πrt
2
(
1− erf(√λB2)
)
√
λ
+R(t, x, λ),
(7.1)
with
R(t, x, λ) = − exp(λh(y∗1))Q′(y∗1)rt
exp(−λB21)
λ
+ exp(λh(y∗2))Q
′(y∗2)rt
exp(−λB22)
λ
+
∫ rδ
−rδ
Q(y) exp(λh(y))dy.
Using Cole-Hopf formula: Define now q(y) = x−yrt + sign(x), and recall that
Ψ(t, x, σ0) = θ
σ0(t, x)− θ(t, x) =
∫ +∞
−∞ q(y) exp(λh(y))dy∫ +∞
−∞ exp(λh(y))dy
.
Recall that 0 ≤ x < rt − rδ. Then, q(y) = x−yrt + 1, and then q(y∗1) = 2 and q(y∗2) = 0.
Therefore, by (7.1) with Q(y) = q(y) and with Q(y) = 1, we obtain
|Ψ(t, x, σ0)| ≤
2
√
πrt exp(λh(y
∗
1))
(
1+erf(
√
λB1)√
λ
)
+
√
2|R(t, x, λ)|
√
πrt exp(λh(y
∗
1))
(
1+erf(
√
λB1)√
λ
)
+
√
πrt exp(λh(y
∗
2))
(
1−erf(
√
λB2)√
λ
) ,
the remainder R being computed with Q = q. Therefore,
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|Ψ(t, x, σ0)| ≤
2
√
πrt exp(λh(y
∗
1))
(
1+erf(
√
λB1)√
λ
)
√
πrt exp(λh(y∗2))
(
1−erf(
√
λB2)√
λ
) +√2I1(t, x, λ) +√2I2(t, x, λ)
= 2 exp
(
λ[h(y∗1)− h(y∗2)]
)(1 + erf(√λB1)
1− erf(√λB2)
)
+
√
2I1(t, x, λ) +
√
2I2(t, x, λ),
where
I1(t, x, λ) =
exp(λh(y∗1))
exp(−λB21)
λ + exp(λh(y
∗
2))
exp(−λB22 )
λ
√
πrt exp(λh(y∗2))
(
1−erf(√λB2)√
λ
) ,
I2(t, x, λ) =
∫ rδ
−rδ |q(y)| exp(λh(y))dy
√
πrt exp(λh(y∗2))
(
1−erf(√λB2)√
λ
) .
(7.2)
Notice now the following key facts:
h(y∗2)− h(y∗1) =
∫ −rδ
y∗1
(−1)dz +
∫ rδ
−rδ
z
rδ
dz +
∫ y∗2
rδ
dz − (x− y
∗
2)
2 − (x− y∗1)2
2rt
=
(
rδ + y
∗
1
)
+ 0 +
(
y∗2 − rδ
)− r2t − r2t
2rt
= 2x,
B2 < 0, B
2
2 =
(
x+ rt − rδ
)2
2rt
≥ max
( x2
2rt
,
(
rt − rδ
)2
2rt
)
.
(7.3)
In particular,
2 exp
(
λ[h(y∗1)− h(y∗2)]
)(1 + erf(√λB1)
1− erf(√λB2)
)
≤ 4 exp(−2λx),
and
|I1(t, x, λ)| ≤ 2√
λπrt
.
Handling I2: To handle I2(t, x, λ), we notice that |q(y)| ≤ 1 for y ∈ (−rδ, rδ). Also, for
y ∈ (y¯, rδ)
h(rδ)− h(y) =
∫ rδ
y
h′(z)dz =
∫ rδ
y
(
z − y¯)rt − rδ
rtrδ
dz ≥ rt − rδ
2rtrδ
(rδ − y)2.
Hence, ∫ rδ
y¯
|q(y)| exp(λh(y))dy ≤ exp(λh(rδ))
∫ rδ
y¯
exp
(−λ(rt − rδ)(rδ − y)2
2rtrδ
)
dy
≤ exp(λh(rδ))
√
2πrtrδ
λ(rt − rδ) .
By the same argument, for y ∈ (−rδ, y¯),
h(y)− h(−rδ) =
∫ y
−rδ
h′(z)dz =
∫ y
−rδ
(
z − y¯)rt − rδ
rtrδ
dz ≤ −rt − rδ
2rtrδ
(rδ + y)
2,
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and using in addition the fact that h is decreasing on (y∗1, y¯),∫ y¯
−rδ
|q(y)| exp(λh(y))dy ≤ exp(λh(−rδ))
√
2πrtrδ
λ(rt − rδ) ≤ exp
(
λh(y∗1)
)√ 2πrtrδ
λ(rt − rδ) .
Now,
h(y∗1) = h(y
∗
2)− 2x, h(rδ) = h(y∗2) +
∫ rδ
y∗2
y∗2 − z
rt
dz = h(y∗2)−
1
2rt
(rδ − y∗2)2 = h(y∗2)−B22 .
Hence,∫ rδ
−rδ
|q(y)| exp(λh(y))dy ≤
√
2πrtrδ
λ(rt − rδ) exp
(
λh(y∗2)
)(
exp
(−2λx)+ exp(−λB22)).
Therefore, by (7.2),
|I2(t, x, λ)| ≤
√
2rδ
(rt − rδ)
(
exp
(−2λx)+ exp(−λB22)).
Conclusion: Collecting the various terms, we obtain, for x > 0,
|Ψ(t, x, σ0)| ≤
(
4 + 2
√
rδ
(rt − rδ)
)
exp(−2λx) + 2
√
2√
λπrt
+ 2
√
rδ
(rt − rδ) exp
(
−λ
(
rt − rδ
)2
2rt
)
.
By symmetry, we get the same result for x < 0.
Acknowledgment
Franc¸ois Delarue and Rinel Foguen Tchuendom are partially supported by ANRMFG (ANR-
16-CE40-0015-01). Franc¸ois Delarue is also partially supported by Institut Universitaire de
France.
References
[1] S. Attanasio and F. Flandoli. Zero-noise solutions of linear transport equations without uniqueness: an
example. C. R. Math. Acad. Sci. Paris, 347(13-14):753–756, 2009.
[2] R. Bafico and P. Baldi. Small random perturbations of Peano phenomena. Stochastics, 6:279–292, 1982.
[3] C. Bertucci, J.M. Lasry, and P.L. Lions. Some remarks on mean field games. Technical report,
https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.00192, 2018.
[4] M. Bossy and D. Talay. A stochastic particle method for the Mckean-Vlasov and the Burgers equation.
Mathematics of Computation, 66:157–192, 1997.
[5] P. Cardaliaguet. Notes from P.L. Lions’ lectures at the Colle`ge de France. Technical report,
https://www.ceremade.dauphine.fr/∼cardalia/MFG100629.pdf, 2012.
[6] P. Cardaliaguet, F. Delarue, J.-M. Lasry, and P.-L. Lions. The master equation and the convergence problem
in mean field games. Annals Maths Studies, to appear.
[7] R. Carmona and F. Delarue. Probabilistic analysis of mean field games. SIAM Journal on Control and
Optimization, 51:2705–2734, 2013.
[8] R. Carmona and F. Delarue. Probabilistic Theory of Mean Field Games: vol. I, Mean Field FBSDEs, Control,
and Games. Stochastic Analysis and Applications. Springer Verlag, 2018.
[9] R. Carmona and F. Delarue. Probabilistic Theory of Mean Field Games: vol. II, Mean Field Games with
Common Noise and Master Equations. Stochastic Analysis and Applications. Springer Verlag, 2018.
[10] R. Carmona, F. Delarue, and A. Lachapelle. Control of McKean-Vlasov versus Mean Field Games. Mathe-
matics and Financial Economics, 7:131–166, 2013.
[11] R. Carmona, F. Delarue, and D. Lacker. Ann. Probab., 44(6):3740–3803, 2016.
[12] R. Carmona, J.P. Fouque, and L.H. Sun. Mean field games and systemic risk: a toy model. Communications
in Mathematical Sciences, 13:911–933, 2015.
[13] A. Cecchin, P. Dai Pra, M. Fischer, and G. Pelino. On the convergence problem in mean field games: A two
state model without uniqueness. Technical report, Universita` di Padova, 2018.
SELECTION OF EQUILIBRIA IN A LINEAR QUADRATIC MEAN-FIELD GAME 33
[14] J.F. Chassagneux, D. Crisan, and F. Delarue. McKean-vlasov FBSDEs and related master equation. Technical
report, http://arxiv.org/abs/1411.3009, 2014.
[15] A.M. Davie. Uniqueness of solutions of stochastic differential equations. Int. Math. Res. Not. IMRN, 24:Art.
ID rnm124, 26 pp., 2007.
[16] F. Delarue. On the existence and uniqueness of solutions to FBSDEs in a non-degenerate case. Stochastic
Processes and Applications, 99:209–286, 2002.
[17] F. Delarue. Restoring uniqueness to mean-field games by randomizing the equilibria. Technical report,
https://arxiv.org/abs/1804.03561, 2018.
[18] F. Delarue and F. Flandoli. The transition point in the zero noise limit for a 1D Peano example. Discrete
Contin. Dyn. Syst., 34(10):4071–4083, 2014.
[19] F. Delarue, F. Flandoli, and D. Vincenzi. Noise prevents collapse of Vlasov-Poisson point charges. Comm.
Pure Appl. Math., 67(10):1700–1736, 2014.
[20] F. Delarue and G. Guatteri. Weak existence and uniqueness for FBSDEs. Stochastic Processes and Applica-
tions, 116:1712–1742, 2006.
[21] M. Fischer. On the connection between symmetric N-player games and mean field games. Ann. Appl. Probab.,
27(2):757–810, 2017.
[22] F. Flandoli. Random Perturbation of PDEs and Fluid Dynamics: Ecole d’e´te´ de probabilite´s de Saint-Flour
XL. Lecture Notes in Mathematics. Springer Verlag, 2011.
[23] F. Flandoli, M. Gubinelli, and E. Priola. Well posedness of the transport equation by stochastic perturbation.
Invent. Math., 180:1–53, 2010.
[24] R. Foguen Tchuendom. Uniqueness for linear-quadratic mean field games with common noise. Dynamic
Games and Applications, 8:199–210, 2018.
[25] W. Gangbo and A. Swiech. Existence of a solution to an equation arising from the theory of mean field
games. J. Differential Equations, 259(11):6573–6643, 2015.
[26] M. Gradinaru, S. Herrmann, and B. Roynette. A singular large deviations phenomenon. Ann. Inst. H.
Poincare´ Probab. Statist., 37(5):555–580, 2001.
[27] O. Gue´ant, J.M. Lasry, and P.L. Lions. Mean field games and applications. In R. Carmona et al., editor,
Paris Princeton Lectures in Mathematical Finance IV, volume 2003 of Lecture Notes in Mathematics. Springer
Verlag, 2010.
[28] L. Ho¨rmander. Lectures on nonlinear hyperbolic differential equations, volume 26 of Mathe´matiques & Appli-
cations (Berlin) [Mathematics & Applications]. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1997.
[29] M. Huang, P.E. Caines, and R.P. Malhame´. Large population stochastic dynamic games: closed-loop McKean-
Vlasov systems and the Nash certainty equivalence principle. Communications in Information and Systems,
6:221–252, 2006.
[30] B. Jourdain and J. Reygner. The small noise limit of order-based diffusion processes. Electron. J. Probab.,
19:no. 29, 36, 2014.
[31] N. V. Krylov and M. Ro¨ckner. Strong solutions of stochastic equations with singular time dependent drift.
Probab. Theory Related Fields, 131:154–196, 2005.
[32] N. N. Kuznetsov. The accuracy of certain approximate methods for the computation of weak solutions of a
first order quasilinear equation. Zˇ. Vycˇisl. Mat. i Mat. Fiz., 16(6):1489–1502, 1627, 1976.
[33] D. Lacker. On the convergence of closed-loop nash equilibria to the mean field game limit. Technical report,
https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.02745.
[34] D. Lacker. A general characterization of the mean field limit for stochastic differential games. Probability
Theory and Related Fields, 165:581–648, 2016.
[35] O.A. Ladyzenskaja, V.A. Solonnikov, and N. N. Ural’ceva. Linear and Quasi-linear Equations of Parabolic
Type. (Translations of Mathematical Monographs Reprint). American Math. Society, 1968.
[36] J.M. Lasry and P.L. Lions. Jeux a` champ moyen I. Le cas stationnaire. Comptes Rendus de l’Acade´mie des
Sciences de Paris, ser. A, 343(9), 2006.
[37] J.M. Lasry and P.L. Lions. Jeux a` champ moyen II. Horizon fini et controˆle optimal. Comptes Rendus de
l’Acade´mie des Sciences de Paris, ser. A, 343(10), 2006.
[38] J.M. Lasry and P.L. Lions. Mean field games. Japanese Journal of Mathematics, 2(1):229–260, 2007.
[39] P. Lax. Hyperbolic Differential Equations. Courant Institute Lecture Notes. American Mathematical Society,
Providence, RI, 2006.
[40] P.L. Lions. The´orie des jeux a` champs moyen et applications. Lectures at the Colle`ge de France.
http://www.college-de-france.fr/default/EN/all/equ der/cours et seminaires.htm, 2007-2008.
[41] J. Ma, P. Protter, and J. Yong. Solving forward-backward stochastic differential equations explicitly – a four
step scheme. Probab. Theory Related Fields, 98:339–359, 1994.
34 FRANC¸OIS DELARUE, RINEL FOGUEN TCHUENDOM
[42] J. Ma, Z. Wu, D. Zhang, and J. Zhang. On well-posedness of forward-backward SDEs - a unified approach.
Annals Applied Probability, 25:2168–2214, 2015.
[43] D. Stroock and S.R.S. Varadhan. Multidimensional Diffusion Processes. Springer Verlag, 2005.
[44] A.S. Sznitman. Topics in propagation of chaos. In D. L. Burkholder et al. , Ecole de Probabilite´s de Saint
Flour, XIX-1989, volume 1464 of Lecture Notes in Mathematics, pages 165–251, 1989.
[45] E. Tadmor and T. Tang. Pointwise convergence rate for nonlinear conservation laws. In Hyperbolic problems:
theory, numerics, applications, Vol. II (Zu¨rich, 1998), volume 130 of Internat. Ser. Numer. Math., pages
925–934. Birkha¨user, Basel, 1999.
[46] E. Tadmor and T. Tang. Pointwise error estimates for scalar conservation laws with piecewise smooth solu-
tions. SIAM Journal on Numerical Analysis, 36(6):1739–1758, 1999.
[47] T. Tang and T.H. Zhen. Viscosity methods for piecewise smooth solutions to scalar conservation laws. Math.
Comp., 66(218):495–526, 1997.
[48] D. Trevisan. Zero noise limits using local times. Electron. Commun. Probab., 18:no. 31, 7, 2013.
[49] A. Y. Veretennikov. Strong solutions and explicit formulas for solutions of stochastic integral equations. Mat.
Sb., 111:434–452, 1980.
[50] A. K. Zvonkin. A transformation of the phase space of a diffusion process that will remove the drift. Mat.
Sb., 93:129–149, 1974.
Franc¸ois DELARUE
Rinel FOGUEN TCHUENDOM
Laboratoire J.-A. Dieudonne´,
Universite´ de Nice Sophia-Antipolis and UMR CNRS 7351,
Parc Valrose, 06108 Nice Cedex 02, France
delarue@unice.fr,
Rinel.Foguen tchuendom@unice.fr
